Using the Fair Sentencing Act to Protect the Criminal Defendant by Spalding, Valerie B.
Campbell Law Review
Volume 9
Issue 1 Winter 1986 Article 6
January 1986
Using the Fair Sentencing Act to Protect the
Criminal Defendant
Valerie B. Spalding
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Survey is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Valerie B. Spalding, Using the Fair Sentencing Act to Protect the Criminal Defendant, 9 Campbell L. Rev. 127 (1986).
SURVEY
USING THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT TO
PROTECT THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 127
II. B ACKGROUND ..................................... 128
III. STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS .................... 143
IV. STATUTORY MITIGATING FACTORS .................... 157
V . C ONCLUSION ..................................... 171
V I. A PPENDIX ........................................ 172
I. INTRODUCTION
We do not live in Utopia. If we did, we should have no need
for the Fair Sentencing Act.' Since we must live with the failings
of man, our duty must be to punish those failings in an even-
handed manner. In North Carolina, we now discharge this duty by
use of the Fair Sentencing Act.2
This Survey provides a guide to defense attorneys who must
deal with the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors set out
in the Fair Sentencing Act.3 The Survey reviews the major cases
handed down by the North Carolina Supreme Court since the Act
was passed.4 It then concentrates on all cases from the appellate
* Research by M. Greg Crumpler, Elizabeth J. Mitchell, clerks; Elizabeth
Morriss, intern; Stanley F. Hammer, Mark D. Montgomery, clerks; and the
author, under the direction of Associate Justice Louis B. Meyer, North Carolina
Supreme Court (1986).
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1 through 15A-1340.4 (1983).
2. Id.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). These factors are set out in the
Appendix.
4. Article 81A was enacted by ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850, amended by
1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 150. Section 6 of the Act was amended by ch. 179 § 14, 1981
N.C. Sess. Laws at 153 to provide that: "This act shall become effective on July 1,
1981, and shall apply only to offenses committed on or after that date, unless
specific language of the act indicates otherwise."
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courts from August 1981 through August 1986, with a view to ana-
lyzing each aggravating and mitigating factor.' The Survey seeks to
show what factors are most likely to result in a remand for resen-
tencing on appeal, and what elements each factor should contain
for a successful appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fair Sentencing Act applies to felonies, other than Class
A or Class B felonies, committed on or after July 1, 1981.6 The Act
limits the once wide disparity of sentences imposed by superior
court judges7 and attempts to strike "a balance between the inflex-
ibility of imposing [a presumptive sentence which insures that]
punishment [is] commensurate with the crime, but without regard
to the nature of the offender, and the flexibility of permitting pun-
ishment to be adapted, when appropriate, to the particular of-
fender."8 Every felony carries a presumptive sentence. A sentence
may not be imposed outside the minimum or maximum statutory
limits set forth for the felony involved.'
Effective appellate review is an essential ingredient of an equi-
table sentencing system. Without some measure of review, "trial
judges could disregard legislatively prescribed guidelines for sen-
tencing, [and] the system would quickly revert to the unjust results
of [a] discretionary system."' 0 Philosophically, the Act seeks,
to balance competing policies: allowing judges to modify
sentences on the basis of aggravating or mitigating circumstances
[which] allow them to humanly judge the relative seriousness of
an act in its unique surrounding circumstances; [while] at the
same time [allowing] legislative specification of the relevant fac-
tors [to] control judicial discretion."
5. This Survey does not cover capital sentencing cases. For a discussion of
capital cases, see Exum, The Death Penalty in North Carolina, 8 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 1 (1985).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1(a) (1983).
7. Hunter and Mangum, Fair Sentencing: The First Five Years, TRIAL
BRIEFS, 1st quarter, 1986, at 10.
8. Note, North Carolina's Fair Sentencing Act: Is It Fair?, 20 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 165, 192 (1984).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983).
10. Final Report of the Legis. Comm'n on Correctional Programs Presented
to the General Assembly at 35-6 (1977).
11. Braswell, Shaping A Safe And Sound Fair Sentence, address to North
Carolina Superior Court judges (March 24, 1984) (quoting Zaleman, The Rise and
[Vo1.'9:127
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The Act specifies four purposes of sentencing: "[1] to impose a
punishment commensurate with the injury the offense has caused,
taking into account factors that may diminish or increase the of-
fender's culpability; [2] to protect the public by restraining offend-
ers; [3] to assist in rehabilitation of offenders; and [4] to deter
criminal behavior." 2 Therefore, the starting point in a sentencing
procedure under the Act must be the actual offense for which the
criminal defendant was convicted, with consideration of the special
circumstances surrounding the crime and any special characteris-
tics of the individual offender. 3
The Fair Sentencing Act specifies sixteen aggravating factors
and fifteen mitigating factors1' each of which the North Carolina
Legislature deemed relevant to the purposes of sentencing."5 Four
questions determine whether a statutory aggravating factor has
been properly found: (1) whether the State has properly and suffi-
ciently proved the factor by a preponderance of the evidence; (2)
whether evidence supporting the factor goes beyond evidence nec-
essary to prove an element of the offense; (3) whether evidence
supporting the factor is the same as evidence supporting another
aggravating factor; and (4) whether the facts relied upon in the
aggravating factor amount to a joined or joinable offense. 6 If one
can answer the first or second questions negatively, or the third
and fourth questions affirmatively, the factor is not properly
found.17 The trial court must determine whether any of the statu-
tory mitigating factors exist even if the defendant does not request
it to do so and must find all such factors shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. "The court need not, however, find a mitigat-
ing factor when the proof offered fails to establish the factor by a
preponderance of the evidence, and an appellate court will not re-
verse [this] failure . . . unless it has been proved by substantial,
uncontradicted and manifestly credible evidence."1 8 In the years
since the Act was passed, the appellate courts have had occasion to
Fall of the Indeterminate Sentence, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 857, 885 (1978)).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (1983).
13. Comment, Criminal Procedure-The North Carolina Fair Sentencing
Act, 60 N.C.L. REV. 631, 633 (1982).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1) and (2) (1983). See Appendix for a
listing of the factors.
15. Fair Sentencing: The First Five Years, supra note 7, at 10.
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing State v. Michael, 311 N.C. 214, 316 S.E.2d 276 (1984)).
1986] 129
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address and interpret nearly every factor.
The North Carolina Supreme Court first considered the Fair
Sentencing Act in State v. Ahearn.19 Ahearn had moved in with a
young woman whom he had met in a bar. During the first two
weeks of their relationship, the young woman's two-year-old child
was in the hospital.2 Although Ahearn had been deaf from birth,
he nevertheless cooked and cared for the the baby once it returned
home, while the mother spent her time elsewhere. 21 He soon be-
came dissatisfied with this arrangement. On July 21, 1981, the
baby died of a cerebral hemorhage caused by multiple blows to his
head inflicted by "some sort of blunt object."22 The examining
physician concluded that the child was the victim of "battered
child syndrome. ' 23 Ahearn was convicted of voluntary manslaugh-
-ter and felonious child abuse pursuant to his guilty pleas. He re-
ceived sentences which exceeded the presumptive terms prescribed
by North Carolina General Statutes Section § 15A-1340.4(f).24 The
trial judge found three factors in aggravation and five factors in
mitigation. Of these, the statutory aggravating factors were (1) the
offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel25 and (2) the vic-
tim was very young or mentally or physically infirm. 26 The statu-
tory mitigating factors were (1) the defendant had no record of
criminal convictions,2 (2) he was suffering from a mental or physi-
19. 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983).
20. Id. at 587, 300 S.E.2d at 691.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 586, 300 S.E.2d at 691.
23. Id.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(f) provides:
Unless otherwise specified by statute, presumptive prison terms for
felonies classified under Chapter 14 and any other specific penalty stat-
utes are as follows:
(1) For a Class C felony, imprisonment for 15 years.
(2) For a Class D felony, imprisonment for 12 years.
(3) For a Class E felony, imprisonment for 9 years.
(4) For a Class F felony, imprisonment for 6 years.
(5) For a Class G felony, imprisonment for 41/2 years.
(6) For a Class H felony, imprisonment for 3 years.
(7) For a Class I felony, imprisonment for 2 years.
(8) For a Class J felony, imprisonment for 1 year.
Ahearn received prison sentences of sixteen years for voluntary manslaughter
and five years for felonious child abuse.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(f) (1983).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(j) (1983).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(a) (1983).
[Vol. 9:127
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cal condition that was insufficient to constitute a defense but re-
duced his culpability for the offense,28 (3) his immaturity or his
limited mental capacity at the time of the commission of the of-
fense reduced his culpability for the offense, 9 (4) prior to arrest or
at an early stage of the criminal process, the defendant voluntarily
acknowledged wrongdoing in connection with the offense to a law
enforcement officer,3 0 and (5) he had been a person of good charac-
ter or had had a good reputation in the community in which he
lived.31 The trial court found, however, that the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors.
On appeal,32 the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined
that the trial court improperly relied upon several aggravating fac-
tors in sentencing Ahearn, but held that Ahearn had "failed to
carry his burden of showing grounds for reversal of the sentences
imposed by showing he was prejudiced by the court's erroneous
findings in aggravation." 3 The North Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.3 The supreme
court held that the trial court's finding that the felonious child
abuse was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel was not supported
by the evidence.3 5 The evidence disclosed that the baby had been
struck on at least three occasions, tied to his crib and placed under
a mattress,3 6 but this fell "short of supporting a finding that the
offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. 37 In interpreting
this aggravating factor, the court found guidance in its capital
cases. The court concluded that the evidence had to show excessive
brutality beyond that normally present in any killing or the por-
trayal of a crime which was "conscienceless, pitiless or unnecessa-
rily tortuous to the victim."38
What concerned the supreme court was the weight given to
the factors as set out in the statute. The court of appeals had ap-
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(d) (1983).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(e) (1983).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(1) (1983).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(m) (1983).
32. State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 295 S.E.2d 621 (1982).
33. Id. at 50, 295 S.E.2d at 625.
34. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983).
35. Id. at 599, 300 S.E.2d at 698.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 34, 292 S.E.2d 203, 228 (1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1056, reh'g. denied, 459 U.S. 1189 (1983)).
19861
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parently indulged in assigning weights to the aggravating and miti-
gating factors despite the fact that the statute reserved this task
solely to the trial court.39 The supreme court stated that appellate
courts were not to attempt to second guess the sentencing judge
with respect to the weight given to any particular factor, nor were
they to engage in numerical balancing in order to determine
whether a sufficient number of aggravating factors remained to
"tip the scales. '4 0 The court concluded:
More important, however, it must be assumed that every fac-
tor in aggravation measured against every factor in mitigation,
with concomitant weight attached to each, contributes to the se-
verity of the sentence-the quantitative variation from the norm
of the presumptive term. It is only the sentencing judge who is in
a position to re-evaluate the severity of the sentence imposed in
light of the adjustment. For these reasons, we hold that in every
case in which it is found that the judge erred in a finding or find-
ings in aggravation and imposed a sentence beyond the presump-
tive term, the case must be remanded for a new sentencing
hearing. 41
Ahearn also contended the trial court had erred in finding the
statutory aggravating factor that the victim was very young or
mentally or physically infirm in the felonious child abuse offense. 2
In support of this argument he pointed to the language of North
Carolina General Statutes Section 15A-1340.4(a) which provides
that "[e]vidence necessary to prove an element of the offense may
not be used to prove any factor in aggravation . . . .-4' He argued
that because the age of the victim is an element of the offense of
felonious child abuse, the trial judge was precluded from consider-
ing the age of the victim as an aggravating factor. The supreme
court however, was unpersuaded, because it considered vulnerabil-
ity as the concern addressed by this factor. The fact that the baby
was very young was not an element necessary to prove felonious
child abuse. In addition, because the baby was immobilized by a
body cast at the time of the attack, it was physically infirm. The
court found no error in the mitigating factors44 as to the felonious
39. 307 N.C. at 602, 300 S.E.2d at 700-01.
40. Id., 300 S.E.2d at 701.
41. Id. (emphasis in original).
42. Id.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4 (1983).
44. Id. at 604, 300 S.E.2d at 701-02.
[Vol. 9:127
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child abuse offense.
With respect to the voluntary manslaughter offense, the court
reached a different result. Because the baby was beaten to
death-struck against a bed post with such force that his cast was
shattered and his skull crushed-so that his injuries were multiple
and death not immediate, the evidence supported the finding that
the offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.45 The evi-
dence also supported the finding in aggravation that the victim was
very young, or mentally or physically infirm.46 However, the court
found error in the statutory mitigating factor that Ahearn volunta-
rily acknowledged wrongdoing to a law enforcement officer prior to
arrest or at any early stage of the criminal process.47 Ahearn had
expressly denied any wrongdoing connected with the baby's death
during his interrogation. In the court's view, the fact that he pled
guilty to the charge had no bearing on the policy behind this miti-
gating factor. Since the court had previously held a defendant's
failure to plead guilty to an offense was not a factor in aggravation,
a plea of guilty was not a factor in mitigation.48
The major difficulty in Ahearn's appeal resulted from the trial
court's failure to list separately the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors for each of the two offenses.4' Separate findings for the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors for each offense would have facili-
tated appellate review and would have offered the appellate courts
the option of affirming judgment for one offense while remanding
for resentencing only the offense in which error was found.50 The
supreme court, therefore, ruled that in every case in which the sen-
tencing judge was required to make findings in aggravation and
mitigation to support a sentence which varied from the presump-
tive term, each offense, whether consolidated for hearing or not,
was to be treated separately and separately supported by findings
tailored to the individual offense and applicable only to that
offense.51
The importance of Ahearn lies in the procedural rulings and
the interpretation of some of the aggravating factors which most
often appear in support of sentences greater than the presumptive
45. Id. at 606-07, 300 S.E.2d at 703.
46. Id. at 607, 300 S.E.2d at 703.
47. Id. at 608, 300 S.E.2d at 704.
48. Id., (citing State v. Boone, 293 N.C. 702, 239 S.E.2d 459 (1977)).
49. 307 N.C. at 598, 300 S.E.2d at 698.
50. Id.
51. Id.
1986]
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term as set out in the statute. The cases following Ahearn which
reached the North Carolina Supreme Court built on the founda-
tions laid out there.
In State v. Chatman52 the defendant was convicted of first-
degree rape, first-degree sexual offense and first-degree burglary.
The trial judge imposed the maximum sentence of fifty years for
the first-degree burglary. 3 To support the sentence, the judge
found two statutory factors in aggravation: (1) the defendant was
armed with or used a deadly weapon at the time of the crime and
(2) he had a prior conviction or convictions for criminal offenses
punishable by more than sixty days confinement."4 The only miti-
gating factor was that prior to arrest or at an early stage of the
criminal process, the defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrong-
doing in connection with the offense to a law enforcement officer."'
Chatman contended that because he used a knife in the rape but
not the burglary," the first aggravating factor was erroneous. His
contention failed. He was armed with the knife at the time he com-
mitted the actual burglary offense and this was enough to bring
him within the straightforward language of that aggravating fac-
tor.57 Chatman demonstrates the courts' unwillingness to make
fine linguistic distinctions in the meaning of the Fair Sentencing
Act, although concededly, Chatman's argument was weak.
In State v. Abdullah,5s the supreme court considered the "pe-
52. 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E.2d 71 (1983).
53. Id. at 179, 301 S.E.2d at 77. The presumptive sentence is fifteen years.
54. Id. In addition, the judge found as a nonstatutory factor in aggravation
that the sentence pronounced by the court was necessary to deter others from
committing the same crime, and that a lesser sentence would unduly depreciate
the seriousness of the defendant's crime. While this Survey does not purport to
deal with nonstatutory factors, defense attorneys should note that the supreme
court held that these two factors fell within the exclusive realm of the legislature
and were presumably considered in determining the presumptive sentence for
first degree burglary. The court held that while both factors served as legitimate
purposes for imposing an active sentence, neither could form the basis for increas-
ing or decreasing a presumptive term because neither related to the "character or
conduct of the offender." Id. at 180, 301 S.E.2d at 78 (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 179, 301 S.E.2d at 77.
56. Id. He had broken into the victim's house by removing an air condition-
ing unit from a window, but did not actually make use of the knife with which he
was armed until he used it to threaten his rape victim. Id. at 172, 801 S.E.2d at
73.
57. Id.
58. 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983). Note that originally this factor was
described as an "offense committed for hire or pecuniary gain," but was amended
[Vol. 9:127
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cuniary gain" factor in depth. Abdullah was convicted of first-de-
gree murder, robbery with a firearm, and felonious conspiracy to
commit robbery with a firearm, all of which arose out of the fatal
shooting of a police officer during the armed robbery of a conve-
nience store. The jury recommended a sentence of life imprison-
ment for the first-degree murder conviction and, based upon a
finding of four statutory aggravating factors, the defendant was
sentenced to the maximum forty years imprisonment on the armed
robbery conviction and to the maximum three years imprisonment
on the conspiracy conviction.59 Abdullah challenged two of the ag-
gravating factors: that the offense was committed for pecuniary
gain and that he was armed with or used a deadly weapon at the
time of the crime.6" He argued that the trial judge erroneously con-
sidered them because evidence necessary to prove the elements of
the offense was duplicated in proving these aggravating factors.6 "
The Fair Sentencing Act provides that evidence necessary to
prove an element of the offense may not be used to prove any fac-
tor in aggravation.62 The supreme court stated this language did
not proscribe the use of evidence which was merely "inherent in
the offense," but rather the use of evidence necessary to prove an
element of the offense.68 Pecuniary gain is not an essential element
of the crime of armed robbery. Therefore, if Abdullah had based
his argument solely on the assumption that the aggravating factor,
pecuniary gain, was an essential element of armed robbery and
thereby precluded under the statute, his argument would have
failed. In addition, however, he pointed out that the correct inter-
pretation of the aggravating factor precludes its use in any circum-
stance other than when a defendant is hired or paid to commit the
offense." He supported his argument with the fact that the North
Carolina Legislature was about to amend the statute to clarify this
aggravating factor. The supreme court agreed the amendment
evinced "the Legislature's intent to avoid the enhancement of a
defendant's sentence simply because money or other valuable
in 1983 to read "the defendant was hired or paid to commit the offense." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(c) (1983).
59. Id. at 65-66, 306 S.E.2d at 101-02.
60. Id. at 75, 306 S.E.2d at 107.
61. Id.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(1983).
63. Abdullah, 309 N.C. at 76, 306 S.E.2d at 107.
64. Id., 309 S.E.2d at 108.
1986]
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items were involved in the crime charged." 8 The court held that in
both the armed robbery and the conspiracy sentences the trial
judge had erred because no evidence existed that Abdullah had
been paid or hired to commit the offenses. Abdullah also success-
fully argued that the trial judge improperly enhanced his sentence
for the armed robbery by finding in aggravation that he was armed
with or used a deadly weapon at the time of the crime. Since an
element of armed robbery is possession or use of a firearm or other
dangerous weapon, use of this aggravating factor was statutorily
proscribed. 6'
State v. Jones67 gave the supreme court an opportunity to ad-
dress the question of the burden of proof with respect to the Fair
Sentencing Act. Jones was convicted of second-degree murder,
armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery and felonious
larceny. He appealed the life sentence imposed for the murder con-
viction, and the imposition of sentences greater than the presump-
tive for the other convictions.68 The terms imposed were all based
on the aggravating factor that the offenses were committed for pe-
cuniary gain and the mitigating factor that at an early stage of the
criminal process, the defendant had voluntarily admitted wrongdo-
ing.69 In connection with the armed robbery conviction, the judge
had also found, as an aggravating factor, that Jones had induced
others to participate in the commission of the offense or had occu-
pied a position of leadership or dominance of other participants.
Jones argued that four mitigating factors should have been found
because they were proved by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)
he was a passive participant or played a minor role in the commis-
sion of the offense, (2) he was suffering from a mental or physical
condition that was insufficient to constitute a defense but signifi-
cantly reduced his culpability, (3) he aided in the apprehension of
another felon or testified truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in
another prosecution of a felony and (4) he could not reasonably
foresee that his conduct would cause or threaten serious bodily
harm or fear, or that he exercised caution to avoid such conse-
quences. 70 Although the supreme court found no evidence in the
65. Id. (quoting State v. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. 586, 303 S.E.2d 86 (1983)).
66. Id. at 77, 309 S.E.2d at 108.
67. 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983), appeal after remand, 314 N.C. 444,
336 S.E.2d 385 (1985).
68. Id. at 217, 306 S.E.2d at 454.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 218, 306 S.E.2d at 451.
[Vol. 9:127
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transcript or record to mandate a finding of the second, third and
fourth mitigating factors, the court agreed that the first factor
should have been found in mitigation because it was supported by
uncontradicted evidence. The court stated that the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act would be eviscerated if trial judges could ignore evidence
in support of a particular aggravating or mitigating factor where
such evidence was uncontradicted, substantial and no reason ex-
isted to doubt its credibility. One of the Act's objectives was for
the punishment imposed to take "into account factors that may
diminish or increase the offender's culpability."'71
The court then proceeded to discuss the burden of proof. The
trial court was to take guidance from principles developed in civil
cases for directing a verdict for the party with the burden of
proof.L 7 2 The court held that the State bears the burden of persua-
sion on aggravating factors if it seeks a term greater than the pre-
sumptive, and the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on
mitigating factors if he seeks a term less than the presumptive.73
This means that when a criminal defendant argues that the trial
court erred in failing to find a mitigating factor proved by uncon-
tradicted evidence, his position is analogous to a party with the
burden of persuasion seeking a directed verdict. He is asking the
court to conclude that "the evidence so clearly establishes the fact
in issue that no reasonable inferences to the contrary can be
drawn,"' and the credibility of the evidence "is manifest as a mat-
ter of law."'75 The court concluded that Jones had indeed played
only a passive role in the murder and remanded the conviction for
a new sentencing hearing. Jones is important for the rules gov-
erning the burden of proof and the standards of proof which the
defendant must reach to gain a new sentencing hearing.
In State v. Blackwelder7 6 the supreme court redefined the fo-
cus of "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and looked at two mitigating
factors not previously considered. The case arose out of a shooting
death for which Blackwelder was convicted of second-degree mur-
71. Id. at 218-219, 306 S.E.2d at 454-55.
72. "In the sentencing scheme set forth in the Fair Sentencing Act the bur-
den of proving aggravating or mitigating factors is not expressly allocated." Id. at
219, 306 S.E.2d at 455.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id., (quoting North Carolina National Bank v. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524,
536-37, 256 S.E.2d 388, 395 (1979)).
76. 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983).
1986]
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der. He had twice shot his victim with a shotgun, the second time
holding the gun's muzzle about an inch from the victim's head, so
that his brains were literally blown out. 7 The defendant con-
tended that the facts did not support the trial judge's finding that
the murder was excessively brutal, or involved an unusual degree
of suffering.7 8 The court found its capital cases instructive for a
definition of an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel offense, but
declined to measure the facts of those capital cases against the
facts of cases decided under the Fair Sentencing Act.79 Instead, the
focus was to be on whether the facts disclosed "excessive brutality,
or physical pain, psychological suffering, or dehumanizing aspects
not normally present in that offense."' 0 The Blackwelder facts
clearly fell within these parameters-indeed, the photographs of
the crime scene bespoke a "ghoulish, bloody nightmare. '81
Blackwelder also contended the trial judge had erred in find-
ing as an aggravating factor that he was armed with or used a
deadly weapon at the time of the crime because evidence of the use
of a deadly weapon was necessary to prove the malice element of
the second-degree murder offense. The supreme court agreed, and
adopted a "bright line" rule to "avoid hair-splitting factual dis-
putes necessitated by having to second guess jury decisions as to
the existence of malice. '82 When the facts justify an instruction on
the inference of malice arising as a matter of law from the use of
deadly weapon, evidence of the use of that deadly weapon may not
be used as an aggravating factor at sentencing.88 Blackwelder fur-
ther challenged the trial court's failure to find in mitigation that he
had been a person of good character or possessed a good reputation
in the community in which he lived. Although Blackwelder pro-
vided witnesses who testified that he paid his bills and was nonvio-
lent when drunk, this testimony was not sufficient to meet the un-
contradicted, quantitatively substantial and credible level
necessary.84 Finally, the court agreed with Blackwelder's conten-
tion that the trial court erred in failing to find his army service as
a mitigating factor. If the evidence at resentencing established that
77. Id. at 411, 306 S.E.2d at 787.
78. Id. at 414, 306 S.E.2d at 786.
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis in original).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 417, 306 S.E.2d at 788.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 419, 306 S.E.2d at 789.
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he had been honorably discharged, the trial judge had to find that
factor in mitigation. The court reiterated, however, that the weight
to be attributed to the factor remained in the trial court's
discretion. 5
State v. Thompson8 gave the North Carolina Supreme Court
the opportunity to consider two other aggravating factors: the de-
fendant attempted to take property of great monetary value, and
had prior convictions of more than sixty days imprisonment.
Thompson was caught inside a building because of a burglar alarm.
He was convicted of felonious breaking or entering and felonious
larceny.8 7 The trial judge found as factors in aggravation that the
offense was committed for hire or pecuniary gain, that the offense
involved an attempted or actual taking of property of great mone-
tary value or damage causing great monetary loss, and that the de-
fendant had been convicted of offenses punishable by more than
sixty days confinement.8 8 The court of appeals found error in all
three aggravating factors and remanded for resentencing. 89 In the
supreme court, the State contended that the trial judge had prop-
erly found that the defendant committed the offense for pecuniary
gain, but, as in previous cases such as Abdullah,90 the court could
find no evidence in the record to support this aggravating factor.9 1
Similarly, no evidence existed to support a finding of an attempted
taking of property of great monetary value. Apparently, Thompson
had intended to take copper from compressor wires inside the
building, but the evidence did not show how much copper was
available, its quality or its value. The supreme court did point out,
however, that if the evidence had been such as to establish an at-
tempted taking of property of great monetary value, the trial judge
would not have been precluded from finding this factor in aggrava-
tion simply because Thompson had been charged with larceny, be-
cause "[t]he additional evidence necessary to prove a taking or at-
tempted taking of property of great monetary value is not evidence
necessary to prove an element of felonious larceny." 92
85. Id.
86. 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983).
87. Id., 307 S.E.2d at 157.
88. Id. at 421-22, 307 S.E.2d at 158.
89. Id.
90. 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983).
91. Id. at 422, 307 S.E.2d at 158.
92. Id. (emphasis in original). The court further emphasized that many of the
statutory factors listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1) contemplate a dupli-
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The court then addressed the most significant issue in
Thompson. On appeal to the court of appeals, the defendant had
challenged the aggravating factor that he had been convicted of
offenses punishable by more than sixty days confinement because
the State had failed to introduce a certified copy of his record."
The evidence of his prior convictions consisted of his own state-
ments on cross-examination and a statement by the prosecuting
attorney.9 4 The court of appeals held that methods of proof, as laid
out in the Fair Sentencing Act, were permissive rather than
mandatory.9 5 But the supreme court went on to say that since the
record showed nothing as to Thompson's indigency or his counsel
representation at the time of the prior convictions, the trial court
could not have found by a preponderance of the evidence that he
was not indigent or that he had had counsel or had waived it at
that time. The court stated that this was a feature of the aggravat-
ing factor of prior convictions which had to be proved by the
State.96 Although the supreme court agreed the statute's language
was permissive as to the method of proof of prior convictions, and
that therefore a defendant's own statements under oath consti-
tuted an acceptable alternative method of proof, it disagreed with
the allocation of the burden of proof as to indigency and lack of
cation in proof without violating the proscription that evidence necessary to prove
an element of the offense may not be used to prove any factor in aggravation. The
court cited State v. Abee, 308 N.C. 379, 302 S.E.2d 230 (1983), where it held that
if the defendants pled guilty to only one act of fellatio, repeated acts of fellatio
were properly considered as aggravating factors under the statute. Thompson, 309
N.C. at 422, 307 S.E.2d at 158 n.1.
93. Id. at 423, 307 S.E.2d at 159.
94. Id.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(e) provides:
A prior conviction may be proved by stipulation of the parties or by
the original or a certified copy of the court record of the prior conviction.
The original or certified copy of the court record, bearing the same name
as that by which the defendant is charged, shall be prima facie evidence
that the defendant named therein is the same as the defendant before
the court, and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein.
No prior convictions which occurred while the defendant was indigent
may be considered in sentencing unless the defendant was represented
by counsel or waived counsel with respect to that prior conviction. A de-
fendant may make a motion to suppress evidence of a prior conviction
pursuant to Article 53 of this Chapter. If the motion is made for the first
time during the sentencing stage of the criminal action, either the State
or the defendant is entitled to a continuance of the sentencing hearing.
96. 309 N.C. at 424, 307 S.E.2d at 159.
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counsel. "Not only is it preferable policy to require a defendant to
object to or move to suppress the admission of evidence of a prior
conviction in the sentencing stage of a criminal trial, such a re-
"197quirement is consistent with our general procedural rules ....
The court held that pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act, the ini-
tial burden of raising the issue rested with the defendant and if he
elected to challenge the admissibility of evidence of his prior con-
victions he was to do so by a method which informed the court of
the specific reason for his objection. If the defendant established a
prima facie showing, then the burden would shift to the State to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evi-
dence was admissible." This ruling follows the procedural man-
dates of State v. Jones.'
The constitutionality of the aggravating factor that the de-
fendant committed an offense while on pretrial release for another
felony charge came before the supreme court in State v. Webb.1'"
Webb was convicted of second-degree murder and armed robbery.
He contended that the trial court erred when it considered as an
aggravating factor that he was on pretrial release on breaking or
entering and larceny charges.10' The supreme court found no merit
in this argument since Webb failed to support it with authority
and the court itself could find none.102 The court reasoned that a
defendant on pretrial release, whether guilty of that felony or not,
would be particularly cautious to avoid committing another crimi-
nal offense. "One demonstrates disdain for the law by committing
an offense while on release pending trial of an earlier charge, and
this may indeed be considered an aggravating factor."' 03 An of-
fender's status as a pretrial releasee in a pending case was a legiti-
mate circumstance to be considered in imposing sentence, and the
legislature could constitutionally require that it be so consid-
ered."' The court found no error in Webb's sentence.
Finally, in State v. Lattimore,'05 the supreme court looked at
97. Id. at 426, 307 S.E.2d at 160.
98. Id. at 428, 307 S.E.2d at 161.
99. 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983), appeal after remand, 314 N.C. 444,
336 S.E.2d 385 (1985).
100. 309 N.C. 549, 308 S.E.2d 252 (1983).
101. Id. at 559, 308 S.E.2d at 258.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d 876 (1984).
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joinable offenses and leadership position in conjunction with the
Fair Sentencing Act. Following his pleas of guilty, Lattimore was
sentenced to forty years imprisonment for attempted robbery with
a firearm, at the expiration of which he was to serve a life sentence
for second-degree murder."0 6 In the robbery offense, the trial court
found, among others, the statutory aggravating factor that Lat-
timore induced others to participate in the commission of the of-
fense or occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other
participants. Lattimore argued that since the State had accepted
his codefendant's plea to accessory after the fact, it had conceded
that the codefendant was not involved in the actual commission of
the offense and therefore he, Lattimore, could not have occupied a
position of leadership over the codefendant. 7 The supreme court
explained that Lattimore's focus was incorrect. "The focus of
North Carolina General Statutes Section 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(a) is not
on the role of the 'participants' in the crime, but on the role of the
defendant in inducing others to participate or in assuming a posi-
tion of leadership."10 8 In this case, the evidence fully supported the
finding of Lattimore's leadership position. The trial judge had
found, however, as a nonstatutory aggravating factor that the de-
fendant had committed a joinable offense. The court stated that to
permit this finding would "virtually eviscerate the purpose and
policy of the statutory prohibition."109 Both convictions were re-
manded for resentencing.
This lengthy overview of the majority of cases in which the
North Carolina Supreme Court discussed various aggravating and
mitigating factors as specified in the statute, together with the pro-
cedural rulings handed down, demonstrates the difficulties trial
courts have experienced in applying the Fair Sentencing Act. How-
ever, the wealth of cases, both in the supreme court and the court
of appeals, affords an opportunity to analyze the direction the ap-
pellate courts are likely to take when faced with challenges to the
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in the Act. This anal-
ysis can guide criminal defense attorneys in using the Act to pro-
tect their clients.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 299, 311 S.E.2d at 879.
108. Id.
109. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(o) specifically prohibits, as an ag-
gravating factor, the use of convictions for offenses joinable with the crime or
crimes for which the defendant is currently being sentenced.
[Vol. 9:127
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III. STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS.
A. The defendant induced others to participate in the commis-
sion of the offense or occupied a position of leadership or domi-
nance of other participants.'0
Most of the cases addressing this factor have held the evidence
was insufficient to support it. Since every aggravating factor must
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, mere conjecture will
not do. In State v. Gore"' the defendant had been convicted of
felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny. The State ar-
gued that the totality of the evidence supported the finding of the
aggravating factor of leadership or dominance. The defendant, un-
like some of his codefendants, was involved in all the break-ins,
had a list of people living in the area whom he considered the most
lucrative to rob, and gave a detailed statement to the police re-
vealing how the offenses were perpetrated, who was involved in
each and the location of approximately half of the stolen property.
In the court of appeals' view, this was not enough to prove leader-
ship or dominance. In addition, the record contained no direct evi-
dence that the defendant was the leader or held dominance over
the other participants. In State v. Coffey ' 2 and State v. Thomp-
son,"' the evidence was once again insufficient. The Thompson ev-
idence tended to show only that the defendant was accompanied
by a codefendant at the time he committed the robbery and that
he told the codefendant of his intention to rob the victim prior to
doing so. In State v. Brame,'"4 the evidence did not support the
finding that the defendant induced a female who had no prior
criminal record to participate in the commission of the offense.
However, in State v. San Miguel,"15 the evidence was sufficient to
110. State v. Miller, 316 N.C. 273, 841 S.E.2d 581 (1986); State v. Payne, 311
N.C. 291, 316 S.E.2d 64 (1984); State v. Lattimore, 310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d 876
(1984); State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451, appeal after remand, 314
N.C. 644, 336 S.E.2d 385 (1985); State v. San Miguel, 74 N.C. App. 276, 328
S.E.2d 326 (1983); State v. Brame, 71 N.C. App. 270, 321 S.E.2d 449 (1984); State
v. Gore, 68 N.C. App. 305, 314 S.E.2d 300 (1984); State v. Thompson, 66 N.C.
App. 679, 312 S.E.2d 212 (1984); State v. Coffey, 65 N.C. App. 751, 310 S.E.2d 123
(1984); State v. Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 301 S.E.2d 107 (1983), disc. review de-
nied, 308 N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983).
111. 68 N.C. App. 305, 314 S.E.2d 300 (1984).
112. 65 N.C. App. 751, 310 S.E.2d 123 (1984).
113. 66 N.C. App. 679, 312 S.E.2d 212 (1984).
114. 71 N.C. App. 270, 321 S.E.2d 449 (1984).
115. 74 N.C. App. 276, 328 S.E.2d 326 (1985).
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support the finding of inducement of others to participate in the
commission of a conspiracy to sell and deliver LSD and the sale
and delivery of LSD, where it tended to show that one defendant
brought in one other person and the second defendant brought in
two others. Since the defendants were the initial movers behind
the scheme, they necessarily were in a dominant, leadership posi-
tion over persons who joined later.
To prove this factor by the preponderance of the evidence,
therefore, the prosecution must show something more than mere
participation by a codefendant. Simple discussion of the crime, as
illustrated in Thompson,16 will not support inducement. Real
leadership or dominance must be shown. Therefore, defense attor-
neys can challenge this aggravating factor successfully on appeal
where codefendants committed an offense together without one
leading or inducing the other.
B. The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.1 7
Only three cases have been decided with respect to this factor
in the time period under consideration. In State v. Thompson" s
the aggravating factor finding was erroneous because the evidence
did not disclose that the defendant was threatened with arrest at
the time he committed the offense or that he was restrained in any
way at any time. Conversely, in State v. Bethea,"9 the evidence
was sufficient to find the factor. The defendant was convicted for
felonious assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer per-
forming a duty of his office. The officer testified he was going to
arrest the defendant for the common law offense of going armed to
the terror of the public. The defendant's attack was an attempt to
prevent his arrest.
This factor rests upon two elements: the defendant must know
he is threatened with arrest and the arrest must be lawful. A de-
fense attorney may find room to maneuver under either of these
elements.
116. 66 N.C. App. 679, 312 S.E.2d 212 (1984).
117. State v. Bethea, 71 N.C. App. 125, 321 S.E.2d 520 (1984); State v.
Thompson, 66 N.C. App. 679, 312 S.E.2d 212 (1983); State v. Simpson, 61 N.C.
App. 151, 300 S.E.2d 412 (1983).
118. 66 N.C. App. 679, 312 S.E.2d 212 (1984).
119. 71 N.C. App. 125, 321 S.E.2d 520 (1984).
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C. The defendant was hired or paid to commit the offense.120
Of the many cases decided under this aggravating factor, the
majority simply state that the evidence was insufficient to support
the trial judge's finding. However, a few cases do shed some light
on the matter. In State v. Harris,12 ' the defendant pled guilty to
seventeen counts of conspiracy to commit larceny and eighteen
counts of felonious larceny. The trial judge found as an aggravating
factor that Harris had committed the offenses for pecuniary gain.
The court of appeals held that this finding was error because pecu-
niary gain is an inherent element of the crime of larceny.12 2 The
Fair Sentencing Act specifically prohibits finding aggravating fac-
tors where they are an element of the crime for which the defend-
ant is being sentenced. Similarly, in State v. Smith12 3 the defend-
120. State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460, 334 S.E.2d 741 (1985); State v. Murray,
310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984); State v. Lattimore, 310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d
540 (1984); State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 311 S.E.2d 540, appeal after remand, 75
N.C. App. 245, 330 S.E.2d 819, writ of supersedeas granted, 314 N.C. 119, 332
S.E.2d 485, appeal dismissed, 315 N.C. 186, 337 S.E.2d 582 (1985); State v. Ed-
wards, 310 N.C. 142, 310 S.E.2d 610 (1984); State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308
S.E.2d 647 (1983); State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983); State
v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451, appeal after remand, 314 N.C. 644, 336
S.E.2d 385 (1985); State v. Abdullah, 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983); State v.
Nelson, 69 N.C. App. 455, 317 S.E.2d 70 (1984), disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 88,
321 S.E.2d 905 (1984); State v. Gore, 68 N.C. App. 305, 314 S.E.2d 300 (1984);
State v. Harris, 67 N.C. App. 725, 313 S.E.2d 915 (1984); State v. Aldridge, 67
N.C. App. 655, 314 S.E.2d 139 (1984), appeal after remand, 76 N.C. App. 638, 334
S.E.2d 107 (1985); State v. Bryan, 67 N.C. App. 558, 313 S.E.2d 613 (1984); State
v. Smith, 66 N.C. App. 285, 312 S.E.2d 222 (1984), disc. review denied, 310 N.C.
747, 315 S.E.2d 708 (1984), appeal after remand, 73 N.C. App. 637, 327 S.E.2d 44
(1985); State v. Tyler, 66 N.C. App. 285, 311 S.E.2d 354 (1984); State v. Harris, 65
N.C. App. 816, 310 S.E.2d 120 (1984); State v. Simmons, 65 N.C. App. 804, 310
S.E.2d 139 (1984); State v. Coffey, 65 N.C. App. 751, 310 S.E.2d 123 (1984); State
v. Thompson, 64 N.C. App. 354, 307 S.E.2d 397 (1983); State v. Foster, 63 N.C.
App. 507, 305 S.E.2d 219 (1983); State v. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. 577, 303 S.E.2d
(1983); State v. Huntley, 62 N.C. App. 577, 303 S.E.2d 330 (1983), disc. review
denied, 309 N.C. 824, 310 S.E.2d 355 (1983); State v. Morris, 59 N.C. App. 157,
296 S.E.2d 309 (1982), disc. review denied, 307 N.C. 471, 249 S.E.2d 277 (1983);
State v. Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 301 S.E.2d 107 (1983), disc. review denied, 308
N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983); State v. Thobourne, 59 N.C. App. 584, 297
S.E.2d 774 (1982).
121. 65 N.C. App. 816, 310 S.E.2d 120 (1984).
122. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
123. 66 N.C. App. 570, 312 S.E.2d 222 (1984), disc. review denied, 310 N.C.
747, 315 S.E.2d 708 (1984), appeal after remand, 73 N.C. App. 637, 327 S.E.2d 44
(1985).
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ant's convictions for aiding and abetting felonious breaking or
entering and felonious larceny were remanded for resentencing
where the evidence did not support a finding that the offenses were
committed for hire or pecuniary gain.
Defense attorneys should note that the amendment to the lan-
guage of this aggravating factor was an effort to clarify it, and that
now the prosecution must produce evidence which by its prepon-
derance tends to show that the defendant was actually hired or
paid to commit the crime. In all the cases considered during the
period covered by this survey, not one exists in which the evidence
was sufficient to support this factor.
D. The offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful
exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of
laws." 4
In State v. Brown 2 the defendant was convicted of conspir-
acy to assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious bodily injury,
conspiracy to commit nonfelonious breaking or entering and two
counts of solicitation to commit murder. The court of appeals held
that the trial court properly used the same evidence to prove more
than one aggravating factor where each crime was committed to
hinder the enforcement of laws by disrupting the defendant's pros-
ecution. In addition, the intended victims of the murders were a
law enforcement officer and a State's witness against the
defendant.
Under the facts of this case, the defense could not successfully
challenge this aggravating factor on appeal. However, this was the
only case found which considered the factor. Possibly, in another
situation, sufficient mitigating factors (which the sentencing judge
must find) might outweigh the aggravating factor to prevent the
defendant from receiving more than the presumptive prison term.
E. The offense was committed against a present or former: law
enforcement officer, employee of the Department of Correction,
jailer, fireman, emergency medical technician, ambulance attend-
ant, justice or judge, clerk or assistant or deputy clerk of court,
magistrate, prosecutor, juror, or witness against the defendant,
124. State v. Brown, 67 N.C. App. 223, 313 S.E.2d 183 (1984), disc. review
denied, 311 N.C. 764, 321 S.E.2d 147 (1984).
125. 67 N.C. App. 223, 313 S.E.2d 183 (1984), disc. review denied, 311 N.C.
764, 321 S.E.2d 147 (1984).
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while engaged in the performance of his official duties or because
of the exercise of his official duties.1 2 s
In addition to State v. Brown,12 7 the court of appeals has ad-
dressed this factor in two other cases. In State v. Castleberry,128
the defendant was convicted for conspiracy to obtain property by
false pretenses, obtaining property by false pretenses, and two
counts of subornation of perjury. The court remanded for resen-
tencing because the trial court had erroneously found in aggrava-
tion that the subornation of perjury offenses were committed
against a deputy clerk of court while engaged in the performance
of her official duties. The clerk was not the victim here. But in
State v. Laney,12 9 where the defendant was convicted of assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury,
the court of appeals found no error because sufficient evidence ex-
isted that the offense was committed against a witness adverse to
him while she was engaged in the performance of her official duties
or because of the exercise of her official duties.
Here, the person against whom the crime is committed is the
key. The person must be one of those enumerated in the statute, or
the aggravating factor may not be found.
F. The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.1 30
The supreme court has extensively interpreted this factor. For
126. State v. Laney, 74 N.C. App. 571, 328 S.E.2d 586 (1985); State v. Castle-
berry, 73 N.C. App. 420, 326 S.E.2d 312 (1985), cert. denied, 314 N.C. 670, 335
S.E.2d 497 (1985); State v. Brown, 67 N.C. App. 223, 313 S.E.2d 183 (1984), disc.
review denied, 311 N.C. 764, 321 S.E.2d 147 (1984); State v. Cook, 65 N.C. App.
703, 309 S.E.2d 737 (1983).
127. 67 N.C. App. 223, 313 S.E.2d 183 (1984), disc. review denied, 311 N.C.
764, 321 S.E.2d 147 (1984).
128. 73 N.C. App. 420, 326 S.E.2d 312 (1985), cert. denied, 314 N.C 670, 335
S.E.2d 497 (1985).
129. 74 N.C. App. 571, 328 S.E.2d 586 (1985).
130. State v. Miller, 316 N.C. 273, 341 S.E.2d 531 (1986); State v. Brown, 314
N.C. 588, 336 S.E.2d 388 (1985); State v. Hines, 314 N.C. 522, 335 S.E.2d 6 (1985);
State v. Watson, 311 N.C. 252, 316 S.E.2d 293 (1984); State v. Payne, 311 N.C.
291, 316 S.E.2d 64 (1984); State v. Atkins, 311 N.C. 272, 316 S.E.2d 306 (1984);
State v. Higson, 310 N.C. 418, 312 S.E.2d 437 (1984); State v. Benbow, 309 N.C.
538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983); State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783
(1983); State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983); State v. Vaught, 80
N.C. App. 486, 342 S.E.2d 536 (1986), disc. review granted, - N.C. - , 346 S.E.2d
147 (1986); State v. Bush, 78 N.C. App. 686, 338 S.E.2d 590 (1986); State v. Bla-
lock, 77 N.C. App. 201, 334 S.E.2d 441 (1985), modified, 316 N.C. 350, 341 S.E.2d
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example, in State v. Atkins, 31 the evidence showed that the de-
fendant broke into the victim's home, placed a sheet and pillow
over her head, and engaged in anal intercourse with her. This evi-
dence did not support a finding that the crime was especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel. The supreme court stated that the focus
should be on whether the facts disclose excessive brutality or phys-
ical pain, psychological suffering, or dehumanizing aspects not nor-
mally present in that offense. Consequently, in State v. Payne,1
32
where the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, evi-
dence that the victim was brutally beaten, kicked, and "body
slammed" onto the floor, that injuries were extensive, that the vic-
tim suffered continuous and extreme pain and that death was not
instantaneous (he died two and a half months after the assault)
supported the finding of this aggravating factor. Again, in State v.
Hines,1 388 a second-degree murder case, the trial court properly
found this aggravating factor where the defendant confessed that
he first slapped, then choked the victim with his hands, left him on
the couch gasping for breath, and later returned with an extension
cord and choked him five times with the cord before finally cutting
off his air supply. The aggravating factor was also properly found
in State v. Bush, 4 where the defendant robbed his mother using a
hatchet.
The key for defense attorneys is whether the defendant's ac-
tions went beyond what is normally present in the particular
crime, be it armed robbery or murder. The fact that the victim
561 (1985); State v. Nelson, 76 N.C. App. 371, 333 S.E.2d 499 (1985); State v.
McLean, 74 N.C. App. 224, 328 S.E.2d 451 (1985), writ of supersedeas granted,
313 N.C. 607, 330 S.E.2d 617 (1985), appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 199, 341 S.E.2d
574 (1986); State v. Sampson, 72 N.C. App. 461, 325 S.E.2d 514 (1985), disc. re-
view denied, 313 N.C. 610, 332 S.E.2d 82 (1985); State v. Wester, 71 N.C. App.
321, 322 S.E.2d 421 (1984); State v. Young, 67 N.C. App. 139, 312 S.E.2d 665
(1984); State v. Braswell, 67 N.C. App. 609, 313 S.E.2d 216 (1984); State v.
Thompson, 66 N.C. App. 679, 312 S.E.2d 212 (1984); State v. Atkins, 66 N.C. App.
67, 310 S.E.2d 629 (1984), rev'd, 311 N.C. 272, 316 S.E.2d 306 (1984); State v.
Sandlin, 61 N.C. App. 421, 300 S.E.2d 893 (1983), disc. review denied, 308 N.C.
679, 304 S.E.2d 760, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983); State v. Medlin, 62 N.C.
App. 251, 302 S.E.2d 483 (1983); State v. Massey, 62 N.C. App. 66, 302 S.E.2d 262
(1983); State v. Hammonds, 61 N.C. App. 615, 301 S.E.2d 457 (1983); State v.
Goforth, 59 N.C. App. 504, 297 S.E.2d 128 (1982); State v. Abee, 60 N.C. App. 69,
298 S.E.2d 184 (1982).
131. 311 N.C. 272, 316 S.E.2d 306 (1984).
132. 311 N.C. 291, 316 S.E.2d 64 (1984).
133. 314 N.C. 522, 335 S.E.2d 6 (1985).
134. 78 N.C. App. 686, 338 S.E.2d 590 (1986).
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died in pain will not support a finding of especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel, since death is normally painful and all murder vic-
tims die. If the defendant's actions prolonged the victim's suffer-
ing, physical or mental, the appellate court is likely to find no
error. The line over which the defendant must not step appears to
be fairly clear since, of the cases surveyed, the majority were re-
manded for resentencing because the evidence did not support the
finding of this factor. However, defense attorneys should be aware
that the factor is written in the disjunctive in the statute so that
courts can find a crime was especially heinous, or especially atro-
cious or especially cruel, and not necessarily all three.
G. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to
more than one person by means of a weapon or device which
would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one per-
son.
135
In State v. Benfield,18 6 the defendant was convicted of two
counts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict seri-
ous injury, felonious breaking or entering, and discharging a fire-
arm into an occupied dwelling. The court of appeals remanded the
case for resentencing because the trial court had found this aggra-
vating factor. The court held that the legislature must have consid-
ered the factor in setting the presumptive term for this particular
offense and therefore the trial judge could not enhance the sen-
tence. In State v. Bethea,3 7 the court considered the nature of a
hazardous weapon or device, and concluded that the legislature in-
tended this aggravating factor to be limited to those weapons or
devices which are indiscriminate in their fire power, such as ma-
chine guns or bombs. A rifle, even in a metropolitan setting, as was
the case in Bethea,3 8 is not normally hazardous to the lives of
more than one person, even if it might be sometimes. And in State
v. Jones,3 9 the supreme court ordered a new sentencing hearing
for the defendant who had been convicted of attempting to burn a
135. State v. Bethea, 71 N.C. App. 125, 321 S.E.2d 520 (1984); State v. Jones,
68 N.C. App. 514, 315 S.E.2d 491 (1984); State v. Benfield, 67 N.C. App. 490, 313
S.E.2d (1984), cert. denied, 311 N.C. 404, 319 S.E.2d 274 (1984), appeal after
remand, 76 N.C. App. 453, 333 S.E.2d 753 (1985).
136. 67 N.C. App. 490, 313 S.E.2d 198 (1984).
137. 71 N.C. App. 125, 321 S.E.2d 520 (1984).
138. Id.
139. 68 N.C. App. 514, 315 S.E.2d 491 (1984).
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hotel. The court declined to define burning as a device which
would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
As the court of appeals pointed out, the element to look for is
the indiscriminate nature of the weapon or device. A rifle, hand
gun or shotgun will not support a finding of this factor. Nor will an
attempt to burn a house to collect the insurance-although a con-
flagration begun in a tightly packed urban area might.
H. The defendant held public office at the time of the offense,
and the offense related to the conduct of the office.
No cases address this factor.
I. The defendant was armed with or used a deadly weapon at
the time of the crime. 4
Provided that being armed with or using a deadly weapon is
not an essential element of the crime for which the defendant is
being sentenced, this aggravating factor may properly be used to
enhance the defendant's sentence. In State v. Toomer,1 41 for exam-
ple, the trial court properly found this as an aggravating factor of
the defendant's first-degree burglary sentence because the evidence
tended to show that he was armed with or used a deadly weapon at
the time of the breaking or entering. Even though the same evi-
dence was necessary to prove an essential element of the joinable
crime of first-degree sexual offense for which the defendant was
also convicted, it was not an essential element of first-degree bur-
140. State v. Toomer, 311 N.C. 183, 316 S.E.2d 66 (1984); State v. Lattimore,
310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d 876 (1984); State v. Abdullah, 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d
100 (1983); State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E.2d 71 (1983); State v.
Heidmous, 75 N.C. App. 488, 331 S.E.2d 200 (1985); State v. Corley, 75 N.C. App.
245, 330 S.E.2d 819 (1985); State v. Sweigart, 71 N.C. App. 383, 322 S.E.2d 188
(1984); State v. Lipscomb, 65 N.C. App. 161, 308 S.E.2d 654 (1983); State v. Riv-
ers, 64 N.C. App. 554, 307 S.E.2d 588 (1983); State v. Yarborough, 64 N.C. App.
500, 307 S.E.2d 794 (1983); State v. Brooks, 61 N.C. App. 572, 301 S.E.2d 421
(1983), appeal after remand, 68 N.C. App. 298, 314 S.E.2d 565 (1984); State v.
Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 301 S.E.2d 107 (1983), disc. review denied, 308 N.C.
680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983); State v. Keaton, 61 N.C. App. 279, 300 S.E.2d 471
(1983), disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 463, 307 S.E.2d 369 (1983); State v. Hough,
61 N.C. App. 132, 300 S.E.2d 409 (1983), disc. review denied, 308 N.C. 193, 302
S.E.2d 246 (1983); State v. Gaynor, 61 N.C. App. 128, 300 S.E.2d 260 (1983); State
v. Morris, 59 N.C. App. 157, 296 S.E.2d 309 (1982), disc. review denied, 307 N.C.
471, 299 S.E.2d 227 (1983).
141. 311 N.C. 183, 316 S.E.2d 66 (1984).
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glary. In State v. Corley,142 on the other hand, no evidence existed
to support the finding that the defendant "used" a gun during the
kidnapping for which he was convicted. In State v. Blackwelder,14 3
the supreme court laid down the "per se" rule: when the facts jus-
tify an inference of malice arising only from the use of a deadly
weapon, evidence concerning the use of that deadly weapon may
not be used to support an aggravating factor at sentencing. 44
Analysis of these and other cases 145 show that only where ei-
ther the use of a deadly weapon is an essential element of the
crime, or the inference of malice is dependent on the use of a
deadly weapon, will the appellate courts find this aggravating fac-
tor improper. The defense attorney, therefore, is thrown back on
the possibility that sufficient mitigating factors will be present in
his client's case to outweigh or at least reduce the impact of this
aggravating factor.
J. The victim was very young, very old, or mentally or physi-
cally infirm.148
In State v. Hines, 47 the supreme court held that the trial
court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that a sixty-two
year-old victim of a second-degree murder was'very old, where the
victim had been a brickmason until he retired five years before his
death. His retirement was due to a disability that was not age-re-
142. 75 N.C. App. 245, 330 S.E.2d 918 (1985).
143. 309 N.C. 410, 806 S.E.2d 783 (1983).
144. Id. at 417.
145. State v. Lattimore, 310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d 876 (1984); State v. Abdul-
lah, 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983); State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301
S.E.2d 71 (1983); State v. Sweigart, 71 N.C. App. 383, 322 S.E.2d 188 (1984).
146. State v. Long, 316 N.C. 60, 340 S.E.2d 392 (1986); State v. Hines, 314
N.C. 522, 335 S.E.2d 6 (1985); State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689
(1983); State v. Vaught, 80 N.C. App. 486, 342 S.E.2d 536 (1986); State v. Fair, 77
N.C. App. 641, 335 S.E.2d 783 (1985); State v. Hitchcock, 75 N.C. App. 65, 330
S.E.2d 237 (1985); State v. Cogdell, 74 N.C. App. 647, 329 S.E.2d 675 (1985);
State v. Williams, 74 N.C. App. 574, 328 S.E.2d 775 (1985); State v. Stanley, 74
N.C. App. 178, 327 S.E.2d 902 (1985); State v. Jackson, 70 N.C. App. 782, 321
S.E.2d 169 (1984); State v. Wheeler, 70 N.C. App. 191, 319 S.E.2d 631 (1984);
State v. Lewis, 68 N.C. App. 575, 315 S.E.2d 766 (1984); State v. Eason, 67 N.C.
App. 460, 313 S.E.2d 221 (1984); State v. Potts, 65 N.C. App. 101, 308 S.E.2d 754
(1983); State v. Rivers, 64 N.C. App. 554, 307 S.E.2d 588 (1983); State v. Monk,
63 N.C. App. 512, 305 S.E.2d 755 (1983); State v. Mitchell, 62 N.C. App. 21, 302
S.E.2d 265 (1983); State v. Gaynor, 61 N.C. App. 128, 300 S.E.2d 260 (1983).
147. 314 N.C. 522, 335 S.E.2d 6 (1985).
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lated, he maintained a business selling drinks after his retirement,
and occasionally went fishing. The court stated that a victim's age
does not make a defendant more blameworthy unless the victim's
age causes him to be more vulnerable to the crimes committed.
Again, in State v. Long,148 the trial court erred in finding as
aggravating factors that the two child victims of the defendant's
assault were very young. The supreme court found that the chil-
dren, at the ages of eleven and fourteen, were not at the beginning
of the age spectrum. In addition, the State failed to present evi-
dence that the children were more vulnerable to the defendant's
assault than the average person would be by reason of their ages.
The court of appeals remanded State v. Lewis 9 for resentencing
on a second-degree sexual offense and a first-degree kidnapping
where the trial court had found this aggravating factor. The victim
was seventeen years old but was not so extremely young as to make
her age reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing. However,
in State v. Sampson,5 ' this aggravating factor was properly found
because the two child victims of the kidnappings and murders were
only three and two years old. Finally, in State v. Williams,' the
defendant's convictions for first-degree rape and first-degree bur-
glary were affirmed where the supreme court had stated"'2 that the
victim was eighty-one years old. This was sufficient to support the
aggravating factor.
The key element in this aggravating factor is vulnerability.
Vulnerability is found at the two extremes of the age spectrum,
such as two and eighty-one. Therefore, if the victim's age lies
somewhere in the middle range of the spectrum, the defendant's
sentence will probably not be enhanced by use of this factor.
148. 316 N.C. 60, 340 S.E.2d 392 (1986).
149. 68 N.C. App. 575, 315 S.E.2d 766 (1984), disc. review denied, 312 N.C.
87, 321 S.E.2d 904 (1984).
150. 72 N.C. App. 461, 325 S.E.2d 514 (1985), disc. review denied, 313 N.C.
610 332 S.E.2d 82 (1985).
151. 74 N.C. App. 574, 328 S.E.2d 775 (1985).
152. "A part of the record of this case in the court below was the decision of
the Supreme Court on defendant's previous appeal in which it is stated that the
victim of defendant's crime is 81 years old. This is basis enough for the trial
judge's finding that she was very old." Id. at 575, 328 S.E.2d at 776.
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K. The defendant committed the offense while on pretrial re-
lease on another felony charge.153
Only three cases have addressed this factor. In all three, the
defendants' sentences were affirmed. As discussed earlier, in con-
junction with State v. Webb,'6 4 the appellate courts frown on the
disdain for the law demonstrated by a defendant who commits an
offense while on release pending trial of an earlier charge. The su-
preme court stated that the trial judge may indeed consider this as
an aggravating circumstance.
L. The defendant involved a person under the age of 16 in the
commission of the crime.
No cases address this factor.
M. The offense involved an attempted or actual taking of prop-
erty of great monetary value or damage causing great monetary
loss, or the offense involved an unusually large quantity of con-
traband.55
In State v. Thompson, '66 the defendant pled guilty to an in-
dictment alleging he took property valued at $3,177.40. Based on
this allegation, the trial court found as an aggravating factor that
the offense involved the taking of property of great monetary
value. The supreme court found no error. The court held that
where a defendant pleads guilty to an indictment which contains
factual allegations which could be the basis for the finding of an
aggravating circumstance and fails to challenge or present any evi-
153. State v. Kelly, 75 N.C. App. 461, 331 S.E.2d 227 (1985), disc. review
denied, 315 N.C. 187, 339 S.E.2d 105 (1986); State v. Herring, 74 N.C. App. 269,
328 S.E.2d 23 (1985), aff'd. per curiam, 316 N.C. 188, 340 S.E.2d 105 (1986); State
v. Covel, 70 N.C. App. 490, 319 S.E.2d 689 (1984); State v. Webb, 309 N.C. 549,
308 S.E.2d 252 (1983).
154. 309 N.C. 549, 308 S.E.2d 252 (1983).
155. State v. Thompson, 314 N.C. 618, 336 S.E.2d 78 (1985); State v. Thomp-
son, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983), aff'd. after remand, - N.C. - , 348
S.E.2d 798 (1986); State v. Sowell, 80 N.C. App. 465, 342 S.E.2d 541 (1986); State
v. Aldridge, 76 N.C. App. 638, 334 S.E.2d 107 (1985); State v. Malone, 73 N.C.
App. 323, 326 S.E.2d 302 (1985); State v. Thompson, 66 N.C. App. 679, 312 S.E.2d
212 (1984); State v. Harris, 65 N.C. App. 816, 310 S.E.2d 120 (1984); State v.
Simmons, 65 N.C. App. 804, 310 S.E.2d 139 (1984); State v. Coffey, 65 N.C. App.
751, 310 S.E.2d 123 (1984); State v. Thobourne, 59 N.C. App. 584, 297 S.E.2d 774
(1982).
156. 309 N.C. 549, 308 S.E.2d 252 (1983).
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dence to rebut these factual allegations, they are deemed admitted
and may be utilized to establish the existence of the aggravating
factor. But in State v. Harris,157 the court of appeals held that the
trial court could not use this factor to enhance the defendant's sen-
tence where the only evidence of value was that used to show felo-
nious larcenies had been committed.
In State v. Thompson,58 the court of appeals remanded for
resentencing because the only basis for this aggravating factor was
that the defendant had stolen some car keys. And in State v. Ma-
lone, 1 59 where the defendant pled guilty to felonious escape, his
sentence could not be enhanced by use of this factor because al-
though damage causing great monetary loss had been inflicted, the
defendant himself had not inflicted such damage. Finally, in State
v. Coffey,1 60 in which the defendant had been convicted for keeping
and maintaining an aircraft for the purpose of keeping or selling
marijuana and for felonious trafficking in marijuana, based on his
possession of more than 100 pounds but less than 2,000 pounds of
the drug, the trial court erred in finding this aggravating factor
because the amount was an element of the offense.
Under this factor, the actual monetary value of the stolen
property or contraband must be fairly high and the property itself
must be stolen, rather than simply the means of access to that
property. The supreme court decision in State v. Thompson 6 '
warns defense attorneys that if a value is alleged in the indictment,
the defendant must, if possible, come forward with evidence to re-
but the allegation. If he does so, and the trial court still uses this
factor in aggravation, a good chance exists for remand for resen-
tencing on appeal.
N. The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confi-
dence to commit the offense.1 62
No cases to reach the supreme court have addressed this fac-
157. 65 N.C. App. 816, 310 S.E.2d 120 (1984).
158. 66 N.C. App. 679, 312 S.E.2d 212 (1984).
159. 73 N.C. App. 323, 326 S.E.2d 302 (1985).
160. 65 N.C. App. 804, 310 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
161. 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983).
162. State v. Raines, 81 N.C. App. 299, 344 S.E.2d 138 (1986), disc. review
granted, - N.C. -, 347 S.E.2d 450 (1986); State v. McGuire, 78 N.C. App. 285, 337
S.E.2d 620 (1985); State v. Hitchcock, 75 N.C. App. 65, 330 S.E.2d 237 (1985),
disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 334, 333 S.E.2d 493 (1985); State v. Stanley, 74 N.C.
App. 178, 327 S.E.2d 902 (1985), disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 546, 335 S.E.2d 318
[Vol. 9:127
28
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol9/iss1/6
FAIR SENTENCING ACT
tor. But in State v. Baucom,165 the court of appeals remanded for
resentencing where the trial court had relied solely on the fact that
the defendant and the victim were brothers to support a finding of
this aggravating factor. In State v. Hitchcock," the court found
no error in the defendant's sentence for second-degree murder
where the State relied on evidence that the victim suffered from
battered child syndrome to obtain the conviction. In this case, the
defendant lived with the child's mother. The trial court properly
found the aggravating factor.
The relationship between the defendant and the victim of the
crime must be such that real trust or confidence exists. Blood rela-
tions would normally be expected to generate such trust or confi-
dence, but as Baucom 65 demonstrates, that fact alone is not suffi-
cient to support this aggravating factor.
0. The defendant has a prior conviction or convictions for crimi-
nal offenses punishable by more than 60 days confinement."'
Of the many cases which have addressed this aggravating fac-
(1985); State v. Young, 67 N.C. App. 139, 312 S.E.2d 665 (1984); State v. Baucom,
66 N.C. App. 298, 311 S.E.2d 73 (1984); State v. Potts, 65 N.C. App. 101, 308
S.E.2d 754 (1983), disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 406, 319 S.E.2d 278 (1984); State
v. Goforth, 59 N.C. App. 504, 297 S.E.2d 129 (1982), remanded, 307 N.C. 699, 302
S.E.2d 162 (1983), aff'd, 67 N.C. App. 537, 313 S.E.2d 595 (1984), disc. review
denied, 311 N.C. 765, 321 S.E.2d 149 (1984).
163. 66 N.C. App. 298, 311 S.E.2d 73 (1984).
164. 75 N.C. App. 65, 330 S.E.2d 237 (1985).
165. 66 N.C. App. 298, 311 S.E.2d 73 (1984).
166. State v. Brown, 314 N.C. 588, 336 S.E.2d 388 (1985); State v. Brown, 312
N.C. 237, 321 S.E.2d 856 (1984); State v. Stinson, 310 N.C. 737, 314 S.E.2d 546
(1984); State v. Hall, - N.C. App. -, 344 S.E.2d 811 (1986), cert. denied, - N.C.
-, 349 S.E.2d 868, (1986); State v. Bullard, 79 N.C. App. 440, 339 S.E.2d 664
(1986); State v. Moxley, 78 N.C. App. 551, 338 S.E.2d 122 (1985); State v. Lane,
77 N.C. App. 741, 336 S.E.2d 410 (1985); State v. Carruthers, 77 N.C. App. 611,
335 S.E.2d 776 (1985); State v. McCullers, 77 N.C. App. 433, 335 S.E.2d 348
(1985); State v. Hensley, 77 N.C. App. 192, 334 S.E.2d 783 (1985); State v. Ben-
field, 76 N.C. App. 453, 333 S.E.2d 753 (1985); State v. McLean, 74 N.C. App. 224,
328 S.E.2d 451 (1985); State v. Moser, 74 N.C. App. 216, 328 S.E.2d 315 (1985);
State v. Stamps, 73 N.C. App. 473, 326 S.E.2d 645 (1985); State v. Malone, 73
N.C. App. 323, 326 S.E.2d 302 (1985); State v. Upright, 72 N.C. App. 94, 323
S.E.2d 479 (1984); State v. Southern, 71 N.C. App. 563, 322 S.E.2d 617 (1984);
State v. Wester, 71 N.C. App. 321, 322 S.E.2d 421 (1984); State v. Harris, 71 N.C.
App. 141, 321 S.E.2d 480 (1984); State v. Nelson, 69 N.C. App. 455, 317 S.E.2d 70
(1984); State v. Brown, 64 N.C. App. 223, 313 S.E.2d 183 (1984); State v. Down-
ing, 66 N.C. App. 686, 311 S.E.2d 702 (1984); State v. Smith, 66 N.C. App. 570,
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tor, a synopsis of several will illustrate its use. In State v. Brown,"6 7
a second-degree murder case, the supreme court held that a plea of
nolo contendere could be used by the trial court to establish this
aggravating factor. But in State v. Harris,168 where the defendant
pled guilty to seventeen counts of conspiracy to commit larceny
and eighteen counts of felonious larceny, the court of appeals held
that the trial court erred in considering the defendant's prior con-
victions where the only proof of those convictions was a statement
by the district attorney. However, in State v. Atkins,16 9 the de-:
fendant's convictions for felonious breaking or entering and sec-
ond-degree sex offense were affirmed where this aggravating factor
was used but the defendant did not object to the admission of evi-
dence of his prior convictions and did not raise the issue of indi-
gency or lack of counsel. And in State v. Smith,170 the factor was
properly used where the defendant admitted his prior convictions
on cross examination. Also, in State v. Wester,17 1 it was properly
used where the prior convictions were based on a Police Informa-
tion Network computer printout. But in State v. Southern, 72 the
court of appeals remanded the defendant's conviction of involun-
312 S.E.2d 222 (1984); State v. Abdullah, 66 N.C. App. 173, 310 S.E.2d 413 (1984);
State v. Atkins, 66 N.C. App. 67, 310 S.E.2d 629 (1984); State v. Harris, 65 N.C.
App. 816, 310 S.E.2d 120 (1984); State v. Bynum, 65 N.C. App. 813, 310 S.E.2d
388 (1984); State v. McIntyre, 65 N.C. App. 807, 310 S.E.2d 119 (1984); State v.
Smith, 65 N.C. App. 420, 309 S.E.2d 1 (1983); State v. Williams, 65 N.C. App. 373,
309 S.E.2d 266 (1983); State v. Norfleet, 65 N.C. App. 355, 309 S.E.2d 260 (1983);
State v. Norris, 65 N.C. App. 336, 309 S.E.2d 507 (1983); State v. Isom, 65 N.C.
App. 223, 309 S.E.2d 283 (1983); State v. Hinnant, 65 N.C. App. 130, 308 S.E.2d
732 (1983); State v. Potts, 65 N.C. App..101, 308 S.E.2d 754 (1983); State v. Salt-
ers, 65 N.C. App. 31, 308 S.E.2d 512, (1983); State v. Herbin, 64 N.C. App. 711,
308 S.E.2d 338 (1983); State v. Monk, 63 N.C. App. 512, 305 S.E.2d 755 (1983);
State v. Foster, 63 N.C. App. 507, 305 S.E.2d 219 (1983); State v. Massey, 62 N.C.
App. 66, 302 S.E.2d 262 (1983); State v. Mitchell, 62 N.C. App. 21, 302 S.E.2d 265
(1983); State v. Green, 61 N.C. App. 1, 301 S.E.2d 920 (1983); State v. Locklear,
61 N.C. App. 594, 301 S.E.2d 437 (1983); State v. Keaton, 61 N.C. App. 279, 300
S.E.2d 471 (1983); State v. Hough, 61 N.C. App. 132, 300 S.E.2d 409 (1983); State
v. Farmer, 60 N.C. App. 779, 299 S.E.2d 842 (1983); State v. Massey, 59 N.C. App.
704, 298 S.E.2d 63 (1982); State v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 330, 293 S.E.2d 658 (1982).
167. 314 N.C. 588, 336 S.E.2d 388 (1984).
168. 65 N.C. App. 816, 310 S.E.2d 120 (1984).
169. 66 N.C. App. 67, 310 S.E.2d 629 (1984).
170. 66 N.C. App. 570, 312 S.E.2d 222 (1984), disc. review denied, 310 N.C.
747, 315 S.E.2d 708, appeal after remand, 73 N.C. App. 637, 327 S.E.2d 44 (1985).
171. 71 N.C. App. 321, 322 S.E.2d 421 (1984).
172. 71 N.C. App. 563, 322 S.E.2d 617 (1984), aff'd., 314 N.C. 110, 331 S.E.2d
688 (1985).
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tary manslaughter for resentencing where his prayer for judgment
was continued. The court held that this was not a prior conviction.
In State v. Malone,173 where the defendant pled guilty to felonious
escape, the court of appeals again remanded because the trial court
had improperly found this aggravating factor based on the convic-
tion for which the defendant was already in custody. In State v.
Stamps,74 the defendant was convicted for involuntary man-
slaughter. His sentence was affirmed because the trial court had
properly found this aggravating factor based on a crime that had
occurred after the crime for which the defendant was currently be-
ing sentenced. The court of appeals explained that the Fair Sen-
tencing Act excludes only those crimes which are joinable with the
crime for which the defendant is currently receiving sentence. Fi-
nally, in State v. McLean,'17 the court of appeals once again re-
manded the defendant's conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury for resentencing because the trial
court had used the same evidence for two aggravating factors.
While the legislature intended a defendant's past record to be used
as an aggravating factor, it can only be used once.
If the defendant is to question this aggravating factor, he must
challenge the admissibility of evidence as to any prior convictions
at trial. He must also raise the issue of indigency or lack of counsel
in those prior convictions-if he does not do so, the appellate
courts will deem the convictions admitted. If he elects to take the
stand, the defense attorney must carefully prepare the defendant
for cross examination. While a Police Information Network record
is sufficient evidence of prior convictions, a mere statement by the
prosecution that such convictions exist is insufficient to support
the factor.
P. The offense involved the sale or delivery of a controlled sub-
stance to a minor.
No cases address this factor.
IV. STATUTORY MITIGATING FACTORS.
A. The defendant has no record of criminal convictions or a rec-
173. 73 N.C. App. 323, 326 S.E.2d 302 (1985).
174. 73 N.C. App. 473, 326 S.E.2d 645 (1985).
175. 74 N.C. App. 224, 328 S.E.2d 451 (1985), writ of supersedeas granted,
313 N.C. 607, 330 S.E.2d 617, appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 199, 341 S.E.2d 573
(1986).
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ord consisting solely of misdemeanors punishable by not more
than 60 days confinement. 7 "
In State v. Albert, 77 the district attorney, in response to a
question from the trial court, stated that only a codefendant, not
the defendant, had a criminal record. 78 The supreme court held
the trial court had erred by failing to consider this mitigating fac-
tor since the State established the defendant's claim by admitting
the truth of the basic facts on which the claim rested.' 79 In con-
trast, the court of appeals affirmed the defendant's enhanced sen-
tence for a conviction of common law robbery in State v. Nich-
ols,180 where the only evidence to support this mitigating factor
was the defense attorney's unsworn statement. But the same court
remanded for a new sentencing hearing in State v. Robinson, 8' be-
cause the trial court had failed to find this mitigating factor where
no evidence existed that the defendant had a record of criminal
convictions.
The Fair Sentencing Act requires the sentencing judge to find
factors in mitigation where the preponderance of the evidence sup-
ports them, even if not requested to do so by the defendant. The
appellate courts will always remand for resentencing on this basis.
But the better practice is to show as many mitigating factors as
possible in a particular case supported by as much evidence as pos-
sible. All that this mitigating factor requires is some legwork sup-
ported by documentation, since an unsworn statement will not suf-
fice if made by the movant.
B. The defendant committed the offense under duress, coercion,
threat, or compulsion which was insufficient to constitute a de-
176. State v. Albert, 312 N.C. 567, 324 S.E.2d 233 (1985); State v. McGuire,
78 N.C. App. 285, 337 S.E.2d 620 (1985); State v. Robinson, 73 N.C. App. 238, 326
S.E.2d 86 (1985); State v. Nichols, 66 N.C. App. 318, 311 S.E.2d 38 (1984), disc.
review denied, 311 N.C. 406, 319 S.E.2d 278 (1984); State v. Smith, 65 N.C. App.
420, 309 S.E.2d 1 (1983); State v. Sandlin, 61 N.C. App. 421, 300 S.E.2d 893
(1983), disc. review denied, 308 N.C. 679, 304 S.E.2d 760, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
995 (1983); State v. Rivers, 64 N.C. App. 554, 307 S.E.2d 588 (1983).
177. 312 N.C. 567, 324 S.E.2d 233 (1985).
178. Id. at 579, 324 S.E.2d at 241.
179. In State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983), the supreme
court recognized that, "evidence is credible as a matter of law when the 'nonmov-
ant establishes proponent's case by admitting the truth of the basic facts upon
which the claim of the proponent rests.'" Id. at 220, 306 S.E.2d at 455.
180. 66 N.C. App. 318, 311 S.E.2d 38 (1984).
181. 73 N.C. App. 238, 326 S.E.2d 86 (1985).
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tense but significantly reduced his culpability.182
In State v. Brooks,'83 the defendant's conviction for discharg-
ing a firearm into occupied property was remanded for resentenc-
ing because the court of appeals held that, as a matter of law, the
trial court could not refuse to consider this mitigating factor after
the jury had found the defendant guilty. But in State v. Mat-
thews,184 the defendant's conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury was affirmed because unsworn
statements by defense counsel as to this mitigating factor were in-
sufficient. Similarly, the court of appeals found no error in State v.
Simpson,185 where the trial court had failed to find this mitigating
factor because the evidence to support it was neither uncontra-
dicted nor manifestly credible.
For the defendant to have this factor considered in the weigh-
ing process, the evidence must be uncontradicted and it must be
properly proven. An unsworn statement will not suffice. This factor
is one that could be used with some success by defense attorneys
where the facts support it, because it involves the defendant's state
of mind at the time of the offense. If the defense attorney can show
uncontradicted evidence that his client was coerced or threatened,
the trial court has no choice but to consider this factor in
mitigation.
182. State v. Bullard, 79 N.C. App. 440, 339 S.E.2d 664 (1985); State v. Rath-
bone, 78 N.C. App. 58, 336 S.E.2d 702 (1985); State v. Seagroves, 78 N.C. App. 49,
336 S.E.2d 684 (1985); State v. Lane, 77 N.C. App. 741, 336 S.E.2d 410 (1985);
State v. Simpson, 77 N.C. App. 586, 335 S.E.2d 526 (1985); State v. Bare, 77 N.C.
App. 516, 335 S.E.2d 748 (1985), disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 392, 338 S.E.2d 881
(1986); State v. Sampson, 72 N.C. App. 461, 325 S.E.2d 514 (1985); State v. Mat-
thews, 69 N.C. App. 526, 317 S.E.2d 62 (1984); State v. Brooks, 68 N.C. App. 298,
314 S.E.2d 565 (1984); State v. Bynum, 65 N.C. App. 813, 310 S.E.2d 388 (1984),
disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 404, 319 S.E.2d 275 (1984); State v. Hinnant, 65
N.C. App. 130, 308 S.E.2d 732 (1983), cert. denied, 310 N.C. 310, 312 S.E.2d 643
(1984).
183. 68 N.C. App. 298, 314 S.E.2d 565 (1984).
184. 69 N.C. App. 526, 317 S.E.2d 62 (1984), disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 87,
321 S.E.2d 905 (1984).
185. 77 N.C. App. 586, 335 S.E.2d 526 (1985), disc. review denied, 315 N.C.
595, 341 S.E.2d 36 (1986).
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C. The defendant was a passive participant or played a minor
role in the commission of the offense. 86
In the second-degree murder case of State v. Brown,187 the su-
preme court could find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in failing to find this mitigating factor where the de-
fendant, as part of a prearranged plan, lured the victim into the
bedroom, helped bind, gag and rob him and helped dispose of the
body. Neither did the court find error in State v. Parker,88 where
the defendant did nothing to discourage his accomplices from stab-
bing the victim and dragging him into the woods; where he took no
action to counteract the ultimate effect of his accomplices' actions;
where evidence existed that he was pleased with the result because
he bore ill will against the victim and where he participated to the
extent that he was a lookout, covered up blood in the road and
disarmed the victim after the stabbing when the victim gained con-
trol of the knife. And as in mitigating factors A and B the court of
appeals found no error in State v. Seagroves,18 9 where the defend-
ant's conviction for conspiring to provide drugs to an inmate was
enhanced. This mitigating factor was insufficiently supported by
defense counsel's unsworn statement that the defendant played a
minor role in the commission of the offense.
From an analysis of the cases considering this factor, passive
participation appears to mean no unilateral affirmative action to
support accomplices in the crime. Parker'90 appears to state im-
plicitly that if the defendant either takes some action to discourage
accomplices or to counteract their actions or does nothing to en-
courage them, then the factor may properly be considered in miti-
gation. Simply driving the getaway car, or acting as lookout, stand-
ing alone, would probably qualify as a minor role, and would
necessitate the trial judge's consideration of this factor.
186. State v. Parker," 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E.2d 497 (1985); State v. Brown,
314 N.C. 588, 336 S.E.2d 388 (1985); State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d
647 (1983); State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983), appeal after re-
mand, 314 N.C. 644, 336 S.E.2d 385 (1985); State v. Seagroves, 78 N.C. App. 49,
336 S.E.2d 684 (1985), disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 384, 342 S.E.2d 905 (1986);
State v. Carruthers, 77 N.C. App. 611, 335 S.E.2d 776 (1985); State v. Rozier, 69
N.C. App. 38, 316 S.E.2d 893 (1984); State v. Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 301 S.E.2d
107 (1983), disc. review denied, 308 N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983).
187. 314 N.C. 588, 336 S.E.2d 388 (1985).
188. 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E.2d 497 (1985).
189. 78 N.C. App. 49, 336 S.E.2d 664 (1985).
190. 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E.2d 497 (1985).
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D. The defendant was suffering from a mental or physical con-
dition that was insufficient to constitute a defense but signifi-
cantly reduced his culpability for the offense. 91
The trial court was not required to find this mitigating factor
where the evidence with respect to any connection between the
crime (murder) and the alleged mental problems of the defendant
were conflicting and inconclusive. So ruled the supreme court in
State v. Watson. 92 In State v. Upright, 93 the court of appeals
found no error in the defendants' consolidated trials and convic-
tions for second-degree murder and accessory after the fact to sec-
ond-degree murder. Since no evidence existed that one defendant
was in such a state of inebriation as to impair his ability to under-
stand the consequences of his conduct, the trial court correctly re-
fused to find this mitigating factor in his favor.
191. State v. Watson, 311 N.C. 252, 316 S.E.2d 293 (1984); State v. Taylor,
309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983), appeal after remand, 74 N.C. App. 326, 328
S.E.2d 27 (1985), disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 547, 335 S.E.2d 319 (1985); State
v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983); State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306
S.E.2d 451 (1983), appeal after remand, 314 N.C. 644, 336 S.E.2d 385 (1985);
State v. Bush, 78 N.C. App. 686, 338 S.E.2d 590 (1986); State v. McGuire, 78 N.C.
App. 285, 337 S.E.2d 620 (1985); State v. Torres, 77 N.C. App. 345, 335 S.E.2d 34
(1985); State v. Benfield, 76 N.C. App. 453, 333 S.E.2d 753 (1985), cert. denied,
311 N.C. 404, 319 S.E.2d 274, appeal after remand, 76 N.C. App. 453, 333 S.E.2d
753 (1985); State v. Barranco, 73 N.C. App. 502, 326 S.E.2d 903 (1985), cert. de-
nied, 314 N.C. 118, 332 S.E.2d 484 (1985); State v. Robinson, 73 N.C. App. 238,
326 S.E.2d 86 (1985); State v. Sampson, 72 N.C. App. 461, 325 S.E.2d 514 (1985),
disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 610, 332 S.E.2d 82 (1985); State v. Upright, 72 N.C.
App. 94, 323 S.E.2d 479 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 513, 329 S.E.2d 400
(1985), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 610, 332 S.E.2d 82 (1985); State v. Sweigart, 71 N.C.
App. 383, 322 S.E.2d 188 (1984); State v. Bethea, 71 N.C. App. 125, 321 S.E.2d
520 (1984); State v. Monroe, 70 N.C. App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 14 (1984); State v.
Grier, 70 N.C. App. 40, 318 S.E.2d 889 (1984); State v. Matthews, 69 N.C. App.
526, 317 S.E.2d 62 (1984), disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 87, 321 S.E.2d 905 (1984);
State v. Bynum, 65 N.C. App. 813, 310 S.E.2d 388 (1984), disc. review denied, 311
N.C. 404, 319 S.E.2d 275 (1984); State v. Ingram, 65 N.C. App. 585, 309 S.E.2d
576 (1983), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 479, 312 S.E.2d 888 (1984); State v. Hin-
nant, 65 N.C. App. 130, 308 S.E.2d 732 (1983), cert. denied, 310 N.C. 310, 312
S.E.2d 653 (1984); State v. Potts, 65 N.C. App. 101, 308 S.E.2d 754 (1983); State
v. Salters, 65 N.C. App. 31, 308 S.E.2d 512 (1983), disc. review denied, 310 N.C.
479, 312 S.E.2d 889 (1984); State v. Brown, 64 N.C. App. 578, 307 S.E.2d 831
(1983); State v. Rivers, 64 N.C. App. 554, 307 S.E.2d 588 (1983).
192. 311 N.C. 252, 316 S.E.2d 293 (1984).
193. 72 N.C. App. 94, 323 S.E.2d 479 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C.
513, 329 S.E.2d 400 (1985), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 610, 332 S.E.2d 82 (1985).
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In State v. Barranco,19' the defendant was convicted for lar-
ceny from the person. The trial court found in mitigation that his
intoxication was a mental condition which reduced his culpability.
The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, finding no merit in the
defendant's argument that his intoxication was also a physical con-
dition reducing his culpability. In State v. Benfield,95 the court of
appeals remanded for resentencing. The defendant was convicted
of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill,
inflicting serious injury, one count of felonious breaking or enter-
ing, one count of assault with a deadly weapon and one count of
discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling. With regard to
this mitigating factor, however, the court held that where the de-
fendant was wounded after he initiated the shootout, his culpabil-
ity was not reduced by this factor. Finally, in State v. Bush,i " the
defendant could not claim this mitigating factor where his use of
marijuana failed to reduce his culpability.
Drugs, drink or prior physical injury are the elements to con-
centrate upon in an effort to have this mitigating factor considered
at sentencing. But each one must have had sufficient impact upon
the defendant so as to reduce his ability to perceive the conse-
quences of his actions. Total intoxication, total inebriation or a
physical condition such that overwhelming pain colored the de-
fendant's actions will probably suffice to have the trial court con-
sider this factor in mitigation.
E. The defendant's immaturity or his limited mental capacity
at the time of commission of the offense significantly reduced his
culpability for the offense. 97
Most of the cases addressing this factor simply state that the
194. 73 N.C. App. 502, 326 S.E.2d 903 (1985), cert. denied, 314 N.C. 118, 332
S.E.2d 484 (1985).
195. 76 N.C. App. 453, 333 S.E.2d 753 (1985), cert. denied, 311 N.C. 404, 319
S.E.2d 274 (1984).
196. 78 N.C. App. 686, 338 S.E.2d 590 (1986).
197. State v. Taylor, 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983); State v. Torres, 77
N.C. App. 345, 335 S.E.2d 34 (1985); State v. Barranco, 73 N.C. App. 502, 326
S.E.2d 903 (1985); State v. Jones, 72 N.C. App. 610, 325 S.E.2d 309 (1985); State
v. Sampson, 72 N.C. App. 461, 325 S.E.2d 514 (1985), disc. review denied, 313
N.C. 610, 332 S.E. 2d 82 (1985); State v. Sweigart, 71 N.C. App. 383, 322 S.E.2d
188 (1984); State v. Matthews, 69 N.C. App. 526, 317 S.E.2d 62 (1984), disc. re-
view denied, 312 N.C. 87, 321 S.E.2d 905 (1984); State v. Ingram, 65 N.C. App.
585, 309 S.E.2d 576 (1983), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 479, 312 S.E.2d 888
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evidence was insufficient to support its finding. As with other fac-
tors, in State v. Torres,'98 the defense attorney's unsworn state-
ment that his client was of limited mental capacity was not enough
to find the factor.
However, if the defendant has a documented history of limited
mental capacity, or has been tested prior to trial for the same rea-
son, the required supporting evidence could easily be presented.
The cases do not clarify whether immaturity means youthfulness
or immaturity when compared to others of the same age. This may
possibly give a defense attorney room to maneuver.
F. The defendant has made substantial or full restitution to the
victim.19 19
In State v. Harris,100 the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy
to commit larceny and felonious larceny. The court of appeals re-
manded the case for resentencing where the trial court erred in
failing to find this factor in mitigation. The evidence that the de-
fendant had made restitution was unrefuted. But in State v. Mat-
thews, 201 the court affirmed the defendant's conviction for assault
with a deadly weapon because the defense attorney had simply
made an unsworn statement that the defendant had made restitu-
tion to the victim.
Properly authenticated evidence or, at the least, a sworn state-
ment are necessary if the defense attorney wants this mitigating
factor considered at his client's sentencing hearing.
G. The victim was more than 16 years of age and was a volun-
tary participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to it.2 02
State v. Elliott"3 is the only case to consider this factor dur-
ing the period covered by this Survey. There, the defendant was
convicted of incest. The court of appeals held that the trial court
(1984).
198. 77 N.C. App. 345, 335 S.E.2d 34 (1985).
199. State v. Matthews, 69 N.C. App. 526, 317 S.E.2d 62 (1984), disc. review
denied, 312 N.C. 87, 321 S.E.2d 905 (1984); State v. Harris, 65 N.C. App. 816, 310
S.E.2d 120 (1984).
200. 65 N.C. App. 816, 310 S.E.2d 120 (1984).
201. 69 N.C. App. 526, 317 S.E.2d 62 (1984), disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 87,
321 S.E.2d 905 (1984).
202. State v. Elliott, 77 N.C. App. 647, 335 S.E.2d 774 (1985).
203. Id.
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was not required to find this mitigating factor merely because the
charges of rape and sexual offense against the defendant were
dismissed.
The age element is straightforward, but the problem of proof
lies in the voluntary participation or consent aspects. Depending
on the offense involved, one can only speculate on the approach
the appellate courts might take. For example, the courts would
probably be more stringent as to the "preponderance" standard in
a rape case than they would in a felonious larceny case.
H. The defendant aided in the apprehension of another felon or
testified truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in another prose-
cution of a felony.20 '
Only one decision from the supreme court has addressed this
factor. In State v. Jones,s°6 the defendant pled guilty to second-
degree murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed rob-
bery and felonious larceny. He argued that the trial court should
have considered this factor in mitigation. But the supreme court
held that he had failed to show aid in apprehension of another
felon because he and his companions in the crime were all appre-
hended by the Georgia police at the same time. In addition, al-
though the defendant agreed to testify against a codefendant as
part of his plea bargain, he was never actually called upon to do so
and therefore he did not testify truthfully as the statute requires.
Since this mitigating factor is written in the disjunctive, either
prong, if satisfied, will be sufficient to compel consideration during
the sentencing phase. However, the actions as set out in the statute
must actually be taken-an agreement to testify if needed will not
suffice.
I. The defendant acted under strong provocation, or the rela-
tionship between the defendant and the victim was otherwise ex-
tenuating.0 6
A wealth of cases have addressed this factor. In State v. Tay-
204. State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983), appeal after re-
mand, 314 N.C. 644, 386 S.E.2d 885 (1985); State v. Yarborough, 64 N.C. App.
500, 307 S.E.2d 794 (1983); State v. Massey, 59 N.C. App. 704, 298 S.E.2d 63
(1982).
205. 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983), appeal after remand, 314 N.C. 644,
336 S.E.2d 385 (1985).
206. State v. Clark, 314 N.C. 638, 336 S.E.2d 83 (1985); State v. Cameron,
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lor,2 °7 the defendant pled guilty to the second-degree murder of his
wife and sister-in-law. He received a life sentence for the latter
murder. Although the trial judge found this mitigating factor in
the wife's murder, he did not do so in the sister-in-law's murder.
The supreme court held that the evidence in support of this factor
for the sister-in-law's murder, "was so meager as to be almost non-
existent," where the defendant had entered the house to look for
his wife, heard a noise behind him, turned and fired his gun twice
at his sister-in-law. The defendant simply failed to carry his bur-
den of persuasion. In State v. Michael,0 8 the court found insuffi-
cient the evidence that the relationship between the defendant-son
and the victim-father was strained even though they argued, and
on the day of the murder the victim spanked the defendant with a
belt and banged his head on the corner of the bed. This evidence
did not compel a finding that the relationship was extenuating. In
fact, in State v. Watson,209 the court stated that a relationship be-
tween husband and wife, including past marital difficulties, is in-
sufficient, standing alone, to support this mitigating factor. In
State v. Cameron,2 10 the evidence showed that the defendant's wife
314 N.C. 516, 335 S.E.2d 9 (1985); State v. Watson, 311 N.C. 252, 316 S.E.2d 293
(1984); State v. Michael, 311 N.C. 214, 316 S.E.2d 276 (1984); State v. Taylor, 309
N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983), appeal after remand, 74 N.C. App. 326, 328
S.E.2d 27 (1985), disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 547, 335 S.E.2d 319 (1985); State
v. Bullard, 79 N.C. App. 440, 339 S.E.2d 664 (1986); State v. Braswell, 78 N.C.
App. 498, 337 S.E.2d 637 (1985); State v. Rathbone, 78 N.C. App. 58, 336 S.E.2d
702 (1985); State v. Lane, 77 N.C. App. 741, 336 S.E.2d 410 (1985); State v. Simp-
son, 77 N.C. App. 586, 335 S.E.2d 526 (1985); State v. Bare, 77 N.C. App. 516, 335
S.E.2d 748 (1985); State v. Benfield, 76 N.C. App. 453, 333 S.E.2d 753 (1985);
State v. Highsmith, 74 N.C. App. 96, 327 S.E.2d 628 (1985), disc. review denied,
314 N.C. 119, 332 S.E.2d 486 (1985); State v. Sampson, 72 N.C. App. 461, 325
S.E.2d 514 (1985), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 610, 332 S.E.2d 82 (1985); State
v. Monroe, 70 N.C. App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 14 (1984); State v. Matthews, 69 N.C.
App. 526, 317 S.E.2d 62, disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 87, 321 S.E.2d 905 (1984);
State v. Brooks, 68 N.C. App. 298, 314 S.E.2d 565 (1984); State v. Martin, 68 N.C.
App. 272, 314 S.E.2d 805 (1984); State v. Puckett, 66 N.C. App. 600, 312 S.E.2d
207 (1984); State v. Ingram, 65 N.C. App. 585, 309 S.E.2d 576 (1983), disc. review
denied, 310 N.C. 479, 312 S.E.2d 888 (1984); State v. Wood, 61 N.C. App. 446, 300
S.E.2d 903 (1983), disc. review denied, 308 N.C. 547, 302 S.E.2d 884 (1983).
207. 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983), appeal after remand, 74 N.C. App.
326, 328 S.E.2d 27 (1983), disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 547, 335 S.E.2d 319
(1985).
208. 311 N.C. 214, 316 S.E.2d 276 (1984).
209. 311 N.C. 252, 316 S.E.2d 293 (1984).
210. 314 N.C. 516, 335 S.E.2d 9 (1985).
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told the defendant she was in love with another man, but it was
conflicting concerning alleged taunting telephone calls by the lover.
The evidence also showed that the defendant broke his wife's jaw
after a session with a marriage counselor and had a love affair of
his own. The supreme court decided that all this evidence was sim-
ply too conflicting to compel a single, rational conclusion and,
therefore, the trial court had not erred in failing to find this miti-
gating factor. Similarly, in State v. Clark,211 the trial court did not
err in failing to find this mitigating factor in a second-degree mur-
der. The trial testimony and an earlier statement by the defend-
ant's estranged wife contradicted a statement she gave to defense
counsel that the deceased previously had pulled a pistol on the de-
fendant, had slapped the defendant's minor daughter, and had
tried to run the defendant's car off the road. Moreover, "[t]he de-
fendant's contention that he acted under strong provocation by
reason of his belief that the deceased was going for a gun was con-
tradicted by his wife's testimony and discounted by his own state-
ment that he did not see a gun. '212 In State v. Martin,2 13 the court
of appeals held that the relationship between the defendant and
the victim was not extenuating where the evidence showed only
that the defendant and the victim were separated and the victim
had custody of their child. The same court held in State v. Ben-
field,2 1 4 that this mitigating factor was inappropriate where the de-
fendant assaulted an innocent bystander. The evidence was also
insufficient to support the factor in State v. Braswell,215 where the
victim was drunk and twice tripped over the defendant's girlfriend,
so that the defendant became "mad" and shot the victim.
The evidence must be uncontradicted and manifestly credible
to support this mitigating factor. In addition, the relationship, to
be extenuating, must be more than for example, a marriage be-
tween the defendant and victim. The cases are unclear as to what
relationship the courts would consider extenuating. The best prog-
nosis may be grounded on a combination of the elements in the
factor: if the defendant and victim are related by blood or law and
evidence of provoking behavior on the part of the victim is uncon-
tradicted, then the factor will be found.
211. 314 N.C. 638, 336 S.E.2d 83 (1985).
212. Id. at 842, 386 S.E.2d at 85.
213. 68 N.C. App. 272, 314 S.E.2d 805 (1984).
214. 76 N.C. App. 453, 333 S.E.2d 753 (1985).
215. 78 N.C. App. 498, 337 S.E.2d 637 (1985).
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J. The defendant could not reasonably foresee that his conduct
would cause or threaten serious bodily harm or fear, or the de-
fendant exercised caution to avoid such consequences.216
In State v. Jones,1 the defendant argued that this factor
should have been found in mitigation. The supreme court dis-
agreed. Since the defendant had gone with the codefendant to a
store and had participated in the conspiracy, larceny and robbery
during which the codefendant used a gun to subdue the store clerk,
his protest when the codefendant returned to the store to murder
the clerk was insufficient to prove that he exercised caution to
avoid the threat of serious bodily harm or fear with respect to the
murder. His overall behavior did not mandate a finding of this mit-
igating factor. In State v. Puckett,218 where the defendant had
been convicted of second degree murder and assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill, the court of appeals held that the trial
court was not required to find this factor because the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act does not refer to attempts by a criminal defendant to re-
strain himself from committing the criminal act. In State v.
Kornegay,1 9 the defendant had been convicted of five counts of
felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny. During his
trial, he had escaped. The court of appeals stated that this mitigat-
ing factor is not available to an offender who merely chooses to
commit lesser crimes.
Here, the defendant's overall behavior seems to be the key. If
he makes no real effort to stop an accomplice from causing serious
bodily harm or fear to others, the factor will be unavailable. This
factor is the opposite to mitigating factor C in that strong unilat-
eral action may afford the defendant the protection of this factor,
but unilateral action there will deny him protection.
216. State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983); State v. Jones,
309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983); State v. Sweigart, 71 N.C. App. 383, 322
S.E.2d 188 (1984); State v. Kornegay, 70 N.C. App. 579, 320 S.E.2d 421 (1984),
disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 175, 326 S.E.2d 34 (1985); State v. Puckett, 66 N.C.
App. 600, 312 S.E.2d 207 (1984); State v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 330, 293 S.E.2d 658
(1982), disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 745, 295 S.E.2d 482 (1982).
217. 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983).
218. 66 N.C. App. 600, 312 S.E.2d 207 (1984).
219. 70 N.C. App. 579, 320 S.E.2d 421 (1984).
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K. The defendant reasonably believed that his conduct was le-
gal.220
Only two cases have reached the appellate courts where this
factor was at issue. In State v. Jones,22 the defendant pled guilty
to shooting into an occupied vehicle and misdemeanor assault with
a deadly weapon. The court of appeals remanded for resentencing,
but on the basis that although the triai court found this mitigating
factor, it had failed to properly weigh the factor against the aggra-
vating factor it had also found. In State v. Lane,2 22 the defendant
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The court of appeals
found no error where the trial court failed to find the factor be-
cause the evidence was contradicted.
These two cases give little direction to defense attorneys. Mis-
take is obviously an element in this mitigating factor. Also, an in-
terpretation of what is "reasonable" may afford some help.
L. Prior to arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process,
the defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing in connec-
tion with the offense to a law enforcement officer.223
So many cases have addressed this factor that discussion of a
220. State v. Lane, 77 N.C. App. 741, 336 S.E.2d 410 (1985); State v. Jones,
73 N.C. App. 578, 327 S.E.2d 54 (1985).
221. 73 N.C. App. 578, 327 S.E.2d 54 (1985).
222. 77 N.C. App. 741, 336 S.E.2d 410 (1985).
223. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983); State v. Graham,
309 N.C. 587, 308 S.E.2d 311 (1983); State v. Michael, 311 N.C. 214, 316 S.E.2d
276 (1984); State v. Lattimore, 310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d 876 (1984); State v. Gard-
ner, 312 N.C. 70, 320 S.E.2d 688 (1984); State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460, 334 S.E.2d
741 (1985); State v. Brown, 314 N.C. 588, 336 S.E.2d 388 (1985); State v. Thomp-
son, 314 N.C. 618, 336 S.E.2d 78 (1985); State v. Clark, 314 N.C. 638, 336 S.E.2d
83 (1985); State v. Long, 316 N.C. 60, 340 S.E.2d 392 (1986); State v. Graham, 61
N.C. App. 271, 300 S.E.2d 716 (1983); State v. Hinnant, 65 N.C. App. 130, 308
S.E.2d 732 (1983); State v. Massey, 59 N.C. App. 704, 298 S.E.2d 63 (1982); State
v. Wood, 61 N.C. App. 446, 300 S.E.2d 903 (1983); State v. Simmons, 65 N.C.
App. 804, 310 S.E.2d 139 (1984); State v. Winnex, 66 N.C. App. 280, 311 S.E.2d
594 (1984); State v. Puckett, 66 N.C. App. 600, 312 S.E.2d 207 (1984); State v.
Brown, 67 N.C. App. 223, 313 S.E.2d 183 (1984); State v. Martin, 68 N.C. App.
272, 314 S.E.2d 805 (1984); State v. Gore, 68 N.C. App. 305, 314 S.E.2d 300
(1984); State v. Sweigart, 71 N.C. App. 383, 322 S.E.2d 188 (1984); State v. Brew-
ington, 71 N.C. App. 442, 322 S.E.2d 205 (1984); State v. Lunsford, 71 N.C. App.
455, 322 S.E.2d 192 (1984); State v. Sampson, 72 N.C. App. 461, 325 S.E.2d 514
(1985); State v. Robinson, 73 N.C. App. 238, 326 S.E.2d 86 (1985); State v. Rath-
bone, 78 N.C. App. 58, 336 S.E.2d 702 (1985); State v. McGuire, 78 N.C. App. 285,
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few examples from the supreme court will illustrate its interpreta-
tion. In State v. Lattimore,24 the defendant admitted in his first
statement to the police that he entered a convenience store with
the intent to rob it and that he shot the clerk, although he con-
tended the shooting was accidental. The court held that the trial
court had erred in failing to find this mitigating factor. In State v.
Gardner,2 2 5 the trial court again erred in not finding the factor,
even though the defendant did not request the finding, when all of
the substantial, uncontradicted and manifestly credible evidence
supported such a finding. However, where the defendant makes a
confession after arrest, he is not absolutely entitled to a finding of
this mitigating circumstance. Instead, the trial judge, in his discre-
tion, may decide whether the statement was made at a sufficiently
early stage of the criminal process to qualify for this factor. The
court so held in State v. Hayes.22 6 In State v. Brown,227 the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing the defendant
for second-degree murder by refusing to find this mitigating factor
because officers extracted the defendant's inculpatory statement
only after substantial time and effort and repeated refusals on the
defendant's part to admit wrongdoing in connection with the of-
fense. In State v. Thompson,228 the court held that where the de-
fendant did not present any evidence regarding the timing of his
confession in relation to the criminal process, he failed to show
that the trial court abused its discretion in not finding the factor.
Finally, in State v. Clark,2 9 where the defendant admitted that he
killed the victim but denied culpability by contending that he shot
in self-defense, the trial court did not err in failing to find the
factor.
Whether the confession is made at a sufficiently early stage of
the criminal process rests in the trial court's discretion.230 But cer-
tainly, if the defendant confesses in his first statement to the po-
lice, provided this has been extracted without great exertion on the
part of the police, this factor should be found. Once again, the evi-
dence of such voluntary acknowledgement must be uncontradicted
337 S.E.2d 620 (1985); State v. Bullard, 79 N.C. App. 440, 339 S.E.2d 664 (1986).
224. 310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d 876 (1984).
225. 312 N.C. 70, 320 S.E.2d 688 (1984).
226. 314 N.C. 460, 334 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
227. 314 N.C. 588, 336 S.E.2d 388 (1985).
228. 314 N.C. 618, 336 S.E.2d 78 (1985).
229. 314 N.C. 638, 336 S.E.2d 83 (1985).
230. 314 N.C. 618, 336 S.E.2d 78 (1985).
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and manifestly credible.
M. The defendant has been a person of good character or has
had a good reputation in the community in which he lives.23'
In State v. Taylor,3 2 the second-degree murder case discussed
in other sections of this survey, the defendant claimed the protec-
tion of this mitigating factor. His character witnesses, except for
one, admitted that their knowledge of the defendant's character
and reputation was limited to their knowledge of him in a local
pool room. None of his witnesses claimed familiarity with the com-
munity where defendant lived nor with his reputation in that com-
munity. These difficulties, the supreme court pointed out, de-
tracted from the credibility of the defendant's evidence. The
testimony was simply not of such quality and definiteness as to be
overwhelmingly persuasive on the question of the defendant's good
character and reputation in the community where he lived. The
supreme court concluded that the trial court had the prerogative to
accept or reject this testimony, and found no error in the trial
court's failure to find the mitigating factor. In State v. Brown,233
evidence that the defendant was a high school student of good
standing and that the mother of his child said she had never
known him to be mean and that he was a "nice guy" was insuffi-
cient to compel a finding of this mitigating factor.
Obviously, the better qualified the character witness as to the
defendant's reputation in the community where he lives, the better
chance of gaining consideration of this factor. Character witnesses
who are friends are likely to carry less weight than those who are
disinterested. None of the cases surveyed found sufficient evidence
to support this factor. Therefore, the astute defense attorney will
ensure that he has done whatever possible to meet the "commu-
nity" and the "disinterested" elements of this factor.
231. State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983); State v. Ben-
bow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983); State v. Taylor, 309 N.C. 570, 308
S.E.2d 302 (1983); State v. Brown, 314 N.C. 588, 336 S.E.2d 388 (1985); State v.
Rivers, 64 N.C. App. 554, 307 S.E.2d 588 (1983); State v. Wood, 61 N.C. App. 446,
300 S.E.2d 903 (1983); State v. Winnex, 66 N.C. App. 280, 311 S.E.2d 594 (1984);
State v. McLeod, 67 N.C. App. 186, 312 S.E.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hanes, 77
N.C. App. 222, 334 S.E.2d 444 (1985); State v. Bare, 77 N.C. App. 516, 335 S.E.2d
748 (1985); State v. McGuire, 78 N.C. App. 285, 337 S.E.2d 620 (1985).
232. 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983).
233. 314 N.C. 588, 336 S.E.2d 388 (1985).
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N. The defendant is a minor and has reliable supervision
available.
No cases address this factor.
0. The defendant has been honorably discharged from the
United States Armed Services. 34
In the four cases addressing this factor, the defendants re-
ceived remands for resentencing because the courts failed to con-
sider their honorable discharges. In State v. Hanes,235 the defend-
ant pled guilty to six felony counts of cocaine possession. The
court of appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to con-
sider this mitigating factor because it did not have a copy of the
discharge.
The better practice is to produce a copy of the defendant's
honorable discharge, but in all cases where such discharge is truly
honorable, the trial court must consider this mitigating factor.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fair Sentencing Act2 6 is a comprehensive statute, cover-
ing those aggravating and mitigating factors which are most often
present in the felonies to which the Act applies.2 37 Both the North
Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
have extensively interpreted the Act's provisions. As a result, cer-
tain common denominators in each aggravating and mitigating fac-
tor are discernible, which provide a starting point for the attorney
who must work within the statutory confines.
No, we do not live in Utopia, but by careful use of the tools
provided by the Fair Sentencing Act and the interpretive case law,
North Carolina criminal defense attorneys may ensure that their
clients are sentenced in the fairest possible manner.
Valerie B. Spalding
234. State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983); State v.
Hanes, 77 N.C. App. 222, 334 S.E.2d 444 (1985); State v. Heath, 77 N.C. App. 264,
335 S.E.2d 350 (1985); State v. McGuire, 78 N.C. App. 285, 337 S.E.2d 620 (1985).
235. 77 N.C. App. 222, 334 S.E.2d 444 (1985).
236. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.1 to 15A-1430.4 (1983).
237. The Act applies to all felonies, other than Class A and Class B felonies,
committed on or after July 1, 1981. Id.
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Appendix
NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL STATUTES SECTION 15A-1340.4(a)
(1983).
(1) Aggravating factors:
a. The defendant induced others to participate in the
commission of the offense or occupied a position of
leadership or dominance of other participants.
b. The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from
custody.
c. The defendant was hired or paid to commit the offense.
d. The offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful
exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement
of laws.
e. The offense was committed against a present or former:
law enforcement officer, employee of the Department of
Correction, jailer, fireman, emergency medical technician,
ambulance attendant, justice or judge, clerk or assistant or
deputy clerk of court, magistrate, prosecutor, juror, or
witness against the defendant, while engaged in the
performance of his official duties or because of the exercise
of his official duties.
f. The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
g. The defendant knowlingly created a great risk of death to
more than one person by means of a weapon or device
which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more
than one person.
h. The defendant held public office at the time of the offense
and the offense related to the conduct of the office.
i The defendant was armed with or used a deadly weapon at
the time of the crime.
j. The victim was very young, or very old, or mentally or
physicially infirm.
k. The defendant committed the offense while on pretrial
release on another felony charge.
1. The defendant involved a person under the age of 16 in
the commission of the crime.
m. The offense involved an attempted or actual taking of
property of great monetary value or damage causing great
monetary loss, or the offense involved an unusually large
quantity of contraband.
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n. The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or
confidence to commit the offense.
o. The defendant has a prior conviction or convictions for
criminal offenses punishable by more than 60 days'
confinement. Such convictions include those occurring in
North Carolina courts and courts of other states, the
District of Columbia, and the United States, provided that
any crime for which the defendant was convicted in a
jurisdiction other than North Carolina would have been a
crime if committed in this State. Such prior convictions do
not include any crime that is joinable, under G.S. Chapter
15A, with the crime or crimes for which the defendant is
currently being sentenced.
p. The offense involved the sale or delivery of a controlled
substance to a minor. Evidence necessary to prove an
element of the offense may not be used to prove any factor
in aggravation, and the same item of evidence may not be
used to prove more than one factor in aggravation. The
judge may not consider as an aggravating factor the fact
that the defendant exercised his right to a jury trial.
(2) Mitigating factors:
a. The defendant has no record of criminal convictions or a
record consisting solely of misdemeanors punishable by
not more than 60 days' imprisonment.
b. The defendant committed the offense under duress,
coercion, threat or compulsion which was insufficient to
constitute a defense but significantly reduced his
culpability.
c. The defendant was a passive participant or played a minor
role in the commission of the offense.
d. The defendant was suffering from a mental or physical
condition that was insufficient to constitute a defense but
significantly reduced his culpability for the offense.
e. The defendant's immaturity or his limited mental capacity
at the time of commission of the offense significantly
reduced his culpability for the offense.
f. The defendant has made substantial or full restitution to
the victim.
g. The victim was more than 16 years of age and was a
voluntary participant in the defendant's conduct or
consented to it.
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h. The defendant aided in the apprehension of another felon
or testified truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in
another prosecution of a felony.
i. The defendant acted under strong provocation, or the
relationship between the defendant and the victim was
otherwise extenuating.
j. The defendant could not reasonably foresee that his
conduct would cause or threaten serious bodily harm or
fear, or the defendant exercised caution to avoid such
consequences.
k. The defendant reasonably believed that his conduct was
legal.
1. Prior to arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process,
the defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing in
connection with the offense to a law enforcement officer.
m. The defendant has been a person of good character or has
had a good reputation in the community in which he lives.
n. The defendant is a minor and has reliable supervision
available.
o. The defendant has been honorably discharged from the
United States armed services.
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